Multilevel governance patterns and the protection of groundwater and drinking water in Florida and the Netherlands by Bressers, J.T.A. & Kuks, S.M.M.
Multilevel governance patterns and the
protection of groundwater and drinking
water in Florida and the Netherlands
Prepared for delivery at the 2nd Political science / University of Florida –
CSTM / University of Twente joint conference
The Politics of Sustainable Development:
Institutions Across Social Scales
University of Florida
February 17-19, 2000
By: Stefan M.M. Kuks and Hans Th. A. Bressers
Center for Clean technology and Environmental Policy CSTM
University of Twente
PO Box 217, 7500AE Enschede, The Netherlands
Phone 0031.53.4893203  Fax 0031.53.4894850
Email s.m.m.kuks@cstm.utwente.nl / j.t.a.bressers@cstm.utwente.nl
2Multilevel governance patterns and the protection of
groundwater and drinking water in Florida and the
Netherlands
Abstract
This paper develops a model of ‘governance’ as an aid for comparing such
governance structures and applies these to a particular policy arena: policies
on the protection of groundwater and on drinking water quality in the
Netherlands and Florida.
The research questions examined by this paper are:
1. Which elements make up a governance structure?
2. In what ways do these elements influence each other?
3. What are the differences between the multilevel structure of protection for
aquifers in Florida and the Netherlands, and how do these differences
relate to other differences in the governance structure?
The analysis in this paper has shown that ‘governance’ involves more
elements than policy objectives and the means to implement policy. These
elements are not simply the sum of individual aspects but are closely
interlinked. We have tried to illustrate how these interrelations work. The case
study we used for this was the comparison between the Netherlands and
Florida regarding the protection of the quality of groundwater and drinking
water. The high degree of similarity between both states highlights the
differences, which exist as well. The interrelations between these differences
can be understood by using our hypotheses of the mechanisms by which they
work.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a model of ‘governance’ as an aid for comparing such
governance structures and applies these to a particular policy arena: policies
on the protection of groundwater and on drinking water quality in the
Netherlands and Florida.
Various current approaches in policy science focus on changes in
government policy when making comparisons (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith
1993, 1999; Baumgartner & Jones 1993). This paper does not so much focus
on (long-term) changes in policy (diachronic study) but compares policies in a
certain sector in different areas (synchronic study). As far as developments in
time are described, this is primarily intended to provide indications of the
relations between the various elements of the governance structure. In this
paper we restrict ourselves to a comparison between the Netherlands and
Florida. The study is concerned less about interaction processes (activities
and interactions between actors) than the more structural elements of
governance, which form both the inputs and outputs of such policy processes.
In comparing the Netherlands with Florida, we concentrate on the differences
between both these areas with respect to the distribution of governance
between the various levels.
The research questions examined by this paper are:
1. Which elements make up a governance structure?
2. In what ways do these elements influence each other?
3. What are the differences between the multilevel structure of protection for
aquifers in Florida and the Netherlands, and how do these differences
relate to other differences in the governance structure?
These three questions are addressed in the next three parts of the paper. The
rest of this introduction discusses the reasons for making a comparison
between the Netherlands and Florida. In part 2 we develop a model of
governance based on various approaches taken in studies of public
administration. Part 3 is also theoretical and presents a vision of the mutual
influences between elements of governance. Part 4 is empirically oriented
and examines to what extent the differences between the relevant policies in
the Netherlands and Florida appear to reflect the expected patterns of mutual
influences or not.
The reason for comparing the governance structure of groundwater and
drinking water protection policies in Florida and the Netherlands is that the
problems underlying the policies in both states display a number of
remarkable similarities. Do different states that have similar problems develop
similar types of policies? Or are there conspicuous differences? And if there
are differences, how can these be explained in terms of administrative
practices?
4Both Florida and in the Netherlands make significant use of
groundwater for their supplies of drinking water. In Florida groundwater
provides about 90% of all the drinking water; in the Netherlands the
proportion is about 66%, but in the north, east and south of the country
almost 90% of drinking water comes from groundwater. The groundwater
systems which are used are vulnerable on a large scale, particularly the
shallow groundwater. In Florida this is because the aquifers are covered by a
layer of porous limestone or limestone with faults, fractures, voids and stream
sinks, etc. (karst) or because the surface strata consist mainly of sandy soils
(the Central Ridge, which stretches lengthwise through the middle of Florida).
In the Netherlands the groundwater systems in the east and south of the
country are most vulnerable. Here the upper layers of groundwater lie under
porous sandy soils. Both in Florida and the Netherlands the deeper aquifers
are better protected.
A third similarity between the two states is that the supply of drinking
water not only depends on highly vulnerable groundwater systems but that
these groundwater systems are threatened to a high degree by diffuse
sources of contamination from intensive agricultural systems, in particular the
application of nitrates and pesticides used in crop protection. In Florida the
nitrates are applied in the form of artificial fertilizers; in the Netherlands the
nitrates are applied in the form of animal manure spread on the fields. This
manure is mainly a by-product of the intensive livestock farms in these areas,
which usually have little arable land. This results in the tendency to spread
excessive amounts of manure on the land. The arable crops that are grown
are mostly fodder crops for the animals (such as maize). In Florida the
groundwater systems are threatened not by intensive livestock farming but by
the intensive fertilization and use of pesticides on citrus fruits, fruit and
vegetable crops, and tree and fern nurseries. These three forms of arable
farming are big business in Florida, just as the intensive livestock farms are in
the Netherlands.
There are more striking similarities between Florida and the Netherlands, too.
Although they differ considerably in size (Florida is more than four times
bigger than the Netherlands) the number of inhabitants in each state is
roughly the same (about 15 million). Although the average population density
in Florida is about 100 per km2 (in the Netherlands this is more than 400 per
km2) the Floridian population is concentrated mainly in the urban coastal
areas, where 70% of the people live. This part of the population is highly
environmentally aware, which makes Florida very different in this respect from
the rest of the USA. A state comparison made in 1987 placed Florida seventh
in ‘commitment to environmental protection’, and the state came eighth in the
following survey held in 1988 (Ridley 1987; Sapowith & Ridley 1988). In both
years the environmental performance of American states was assessed
according to a figure allotted on the basis of the environmental programmes
they had developed. In this test Florida scored particularly well in the area of
groundwater programmes (scoring 9 out of 10) but only just scraped a pass
for ‘reducing pesticides contamination’ (6 out of 10). If we compare this with
the Netherlands, what is striking is that the Netherlands also has a reputation
for a high level of environmental awareness among the population and for
having well developed environmental programmes. The Dutch National
5Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) of 1988 was the first example in the world
of an integrated national environmental plan. In both states a powerful
agricultural policy community, as well as a certain level of environmental
awareness among citizens, seem to be influential political factors.
Furthermore, both states have a special relationship with water issues and
groundwater plays a crucial role in the functioning of their ecosystems. The
growth of public awareness of groundwater as an issue and the placing of this
issue on the political agenda took place in both the Netherlands and Florida
from the beginning of the 1980s, and led within a period of 10 years (1985–
1995) to the development of detailed policy programmes and legislation. At
the regional level, water management has been institutionalized and
democratized in a similar way in both states (water management districts in
Florida and water boards in the Netherlands) under a form of management
(functional democracy) that can be considered quite unique internationally.
Historically, water management in both states has enjoyed a prominent
position in public life and is an important area of policy.
We are interested how two states that are geographically far apart and both
part of different wider administrative associations (Florida as a state within a
federal nation and the Netherlands as a member state of the European
Union) and which are confronted by a similar policy problem – and that also
display a number of other striking similarities that are relevant to the problem
– deal with this problem. To explain similarities and differences in policy
approach we expect to be able to make use of an explanatory model that
offers insight into the governance structure of the policy sector that will be the
subject of the comparison. In the next two sections we will construct such a
model, drawing on a number of developments in the policy sciences.
62  Visions and Synthesis
2.1  Introduction
In recent decades there have been many developments in the way we think
of the concept of government policy. One reason for these changes in the
way we view government policy in recent years is that more attention has
been given to the fact that developments in different sectors of society are
guided not only by government but are a result of an interplay between many
actors. Within such networks of actors, government may have a more or less
central and dominant position, or it may not. This means that attention is
shifting from government policy – or ‘government’ – to ‘governance’. In
addition, there is also greater recognition of the fact that sectors of society are
not managed at one level, or at different levels separately, but by an interplay
between these different levels. These levels are often linked to different tiers
of government, but this does not need to be the case if there are powerful
non-governmental actors that provide direction at a specific level without there
being a government body active at that level. This process is known as
‘multilevel governance’.
In this part of the paper we will try to develop as complete a model as
possible of the elements of a ‘governance regime’. Later, using this model, we
can compare the governance regimes and the changes they undergo in
different sectors and/or different places. In this case we compare the
protection of groundwater and drinking water supply in the Netherlands and
Florida. We develop this model through a synthesis of policy science
approaches, and the different emphases in various approaches each have a
place in the model. When developing the model we start from the concept of
‘policy’, which we build up using the various elements until we arrive at a
‘governance regime’.
In the synthesis that is made here we do not start with the policy
process but with the context and content of government policy. But what is
context and what is content is not so easy to establish. The perception of the
problem, for example, may be considered to be a part of the policy or a part of
the context; it all depends on how narrow or broad one’s conception of policy
is. We choose to view policy in the broadest sense. The consequence of this
is that, on the one hand, all elements of the governance structure can be
accommodated in the scheme (but not the activities and interactions that are
part of the process of governance itself), while on the other hand we can
assume that there are relations between all these elements (and not just
between elements of the context and elements of the content of policy). All
the identified elements are part of the content of policy and all are a part of
the context of each other. In the following section we examine the relations
between the various elements identified below.
A definition of government policy much used in the Netherlands, and which
we use as a starting point, is that of Hoogerwerf (1998: 23). He describes
7policy (as a synonym for the content of policy) as: ‘attempting to achieve a
particular objective using particular means at particular times’. Thinking in
terms of objectives and means is considered by him to be the basic structure
of every policy. The term ‘means’ is considered to be a synonym for
instruments.
This premise will be further developed using various policy science
approaches. Of course, many of these approaches have other purposes than
identifying elements of the content of policy and governance. For example,
they may be used to explain long-term policy changes, or the effectiveness of
policy instruments. It is not the intention of our discussion to do justice to the
approaches in their own right; what we want to do here is use these
approaches as sources of inspiration for our goal of building as complete a
model as possible of governance structures
Moreover, an ‘injustice’ will be done to most approaches in the sense
that they will not be left intact, but only the most specific features highlighted.
Aspects that are also to be found in other approaches and that generally tend
to soften the bias in these specific features in a certain approach are not
treated. The intention is not to judge these approaches but to enrich our
approach to ‘governance’ in the light of the wealth of aspects brought to light
by the policy science approaches examined.
2.2  The stage model of the policy cycle
In the stage model of the policy cycle the policy process is divided into a
number of subprocesses, such as political agenda-setting, policy preparation,
policy determination, policy implementation and policy evaluation and
feedback. This could provide a useful basis for analyzing the content of policy
as, in principle, each stage produces an ‘intermediate product’ (in turn: points
of particular interest, proposals, decisions, applications, results and lessons),
which will eventually lead to the complete policy content. Nevertheless, we will
not use these assumed intermediate products as elements.
The classical stage model of the policy cycle raises the question of the
extent to which such subprocesses are only analytical constructions or
whether they can also be identified in real life. Setting political agendas can
be considered to be an aspect that is present in all policy processes. The
same can be said for evaluation. Feedback consists of shorter and longer
loops that lead to repetition in an altered form of other subprocesses, and so
this is also not a subprocess in its own right. In short: if we are to use ‘real life’
processes, then setting agendas, evaluation and feedback are possibly not
separate subprocesses of the policy cycle. Policy preparation and policy
determination are in day-to-day empirical practice often also so closely related
that it is usually not worth while analyzing these as separate processes.
This leaves just two policy processes from the traditional policy cycle:
policy development and policy implementation. But where does this leave the
succession of many administrative levels? (In climate policy, for example,
these are the global, EU and national levels, and sometimes the provincial
and local levels.) What is policy implementation for one level, is policy
development for the next level. In principle, it is possible to make an analytical
distinction between policy development processes and policy implementation
8processes that can be useful for analyzing these processes. In doing this,
policy development processes are processes that involve turning diffuse
inputs into a more focused output, and policy implementation processes are
processes that involve turning a more or less focused input (the ‘policy’) into a
number of diffuse outputs. When looked at this way, though, making a
distinction between policy development and policy implementation means that
the analyst must first himself specify what this focused output–input is.
Whether policy development and policy implementation are different
processes depends on the question of whether there is a separate arena
(playing field), an own game that can reasonably be distinguished from others
and a largely non-overlapping group of actors involved. In other words, this is
an empirical question. The answer will sometimes give cause to draw a
distinction between processes and sometimes not, depending on the goal of
the research (cf. DeLeon 1999).
The above is not much help for our purposes, though. It would seem to
be sensible not to view the division of the policy process into subprocesses as
a matter of fact but as an empirical question. In many cases only a distinction
between the process of developing and implementing the content of a policy
as specified by the analyst will hold water. A listing of possible intermediate
products is unsuitable as a basis for a model of the content of policy and
governance.
2.3  Interaction processes and instrument theory
An elaboration of thinking in terms of policy processes is to emphasize the
character of these processes as social interaction processes, as has been the
case in the Twente policy sciences approach. Here, attention has shifted from
viewing policy as a sort of production process with semifinished products and
an end product to a vision in which the actors participating in the process are
the central concern. In this vision the course and outcomes of the processes
depend not only on the inputs to the process but mainly on the characteristics
of the actors involved, particularly their objectives, information and power. All
other factors that influence the process do so because, and in so far as, they
influence the characteristics of the actors involved. This also applies to the
influence of policy instruments. Not all characteristics of actors, however, are
determined by policy, and so it is not possible to describe a policy without
paying attention to the actors involved in that policy. These actors are,
therefore, allocated a place in a graphic model of the policy (Bressers, 1983).
Moreover, the processes in this vision are not only linked in one series
or cycle, but are part of a large number of societal processes in which
government authorities sometimes participate and sometimes do not. All
these processes are connected to other processes in a complicated web via
their inputs and outputs, and possibly indirectly linked to all other processes.
Each definition of a sector of society draws a more or less arbitrary boundary
round a cluster of processes in this web. In practice, the boundaries that are
drawn between policy development and policy implementation are the same
as those between a higher and lower tiers of government (Bressers 1983;
Honigh 1985; Bressers & Honigh 1986).
9The ‘instrument theory’ which stems from this perspective focuses on
the application and effects of instruments on the target groups of policy
(Bressers & Klok 1987; Bressers, Klok, Kuks & Lulofs 1988; Klok 1991). It
also takes account of the fact that instruments do not influence the
characteristics of the actors involved separately but rather as a package or as
an ‘instrument strategy’. Instruments and strategies have various properties,
for example a certain proportionality between target group behavior and
government reaction to this behavior, or giving resources to the target group
or taking these resources away from the target group. Such properties of
instrument strategies affect their applicability in practice. Klok emphasizes
that some of the instruments are designed to give those implementing the
policy the power to apply other instruments (Klok 1991: 176-194) and also
that the implementing organizations depend on being equipped with sufficient
capacity and expertise (idem: 163-164; see also Bressers 1983: 218-237 and
256-274). In his thesis, Arentsen (1991) exhaustively discusses the relation
between the policy organization and policy implementation.
Later publications on this approach (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Bressers
1993; Bressers, O’Toole & Richardson 1994; Bressers, Huitema & Kuks
1994) have paid more attention to the interrelations between the actors,
including actors that do not directly participate in the processes under
examination. Klok (1995) gives primary importance to the allocation and
removal of resources in such relations and in the classification of policy
instruments. The mutual relations between actors within such policy networks
are seen as an important factor in the development of the content of policy
(Ligteringen 1999). In addition, the relation between policy processes at the
various administrative levels is explicitly dealt with (Bressers, Kuks &
Ligteringen 1998). During this theoretical development, the approach to policy
as an interactive process and the instrument theory based on this gradually
grew into an integrative policy science approach, uniting elements from a
variety of other approaches.
This discussion brings us to the following provisional elements of governance:
1. Administrative levels
2. Actors in the policy network
3. Objectives
4. Strategies and instruments
5. Organization of implementation.
We now examine what modifications are made if we bring a few other
integrative policy science approaches into consideration: Ostrom’s
institutional approach and Sabatier’s ‘advocacy coalition framework’.
2.4  The ‘institutional rational choice approach’
Ostrom’s institutional model is in essence a ‘rule-based’ approach. Although
in later work (for example Ostrom 1999) attention is also paid to the
characteristics of the actors themselves and the physical conditions as the
context of the processes, the distinguishing feature of the approach is that
collections of rules are used to describe the ‘action arena’ in which such
processes take place.
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Ostrom (1999: 52-53) distinguishes seven different types of rules which
together define the arena: ‘entry and exit’ rules that determine who may take
up a position between the actors and who may not; ‘position’ rules that
determine which position these actors have in the network; ‘scope’ rules that
state the field to which this position relates; ‘authority’ rules that indicate the
competences of the actors as experienced by themselves; ‘aggregation’ rules
that state for certain actions, in the experience of the actors, whether
permission from others is required or not; ‘information’ rules that state what is
known and to whom and how this information is disseminated – for example
whether information must remain secret or whether is should be made public;
and ‘payoff’ rules that state what the benefits or sanctions are for the various
actors and how these are arrived at (for example, regarding compliance with
or infringement of rules, who checks compliance and imposes sanctions, and
how). These categories appear to partly overlap (Heilman 1992: 81).
Nevertheless, they can enrich the elements of governance we have identified.
This applies in particular to the element ‘networks and actors’. In the
instrument theory the composition and position of the actors involved in the
network is assumed to be a given fact. The first two types of rules require that
attention is given to the fact that these are crucial variables.  A similar
situation applies to the ‘scope’ rules that determine the extent of certain
positions, competences and other sources of power. For that matter, when
applying the model many of these rules are related to the allocation of
ownership and use rights between those involved (Ostrom 1990).
An interesting fact is that a few times it is explicitly stated that it is not
the ‘objective’ rules that describe the actual arena but the way in which these
are experienced in the eyes of those involved. Something similar is
emphasized by listing the ‘information’ rules as separate entities, which also
require that particular attention be paid to the limitations of the available
information. Incidentally, a parallel can be drawn between the last four types
of rules and the three characteristics of power (2x), information and objectives
from the instrument theory. The difference always lies in the fact that these
are not described as characteristics of the actors involved but of the rules of
the game for each situation. Besides institutional arrangements, Ostrom also
recognizes ‘characteristics of the community’ and ‘events and the nature of
the goods (for example groundwater and the physical features of the aquifers)
as influencing the choice situation (Kiser & Ostrom 1982; Sabatier 1991).
Another aspect of Ostrom’s approach is that she makes a distinction
between the different levels of analysis. Rules that influence ‘operational’
situations such as production and consumption are made at a higher or
deeper level of ‘collective choice situations’. Making these rules is, in turn,
subject to ‘constitutional’ rules, etc. This layered structure of the rule context
is not the same as a classification of administrative layers. After all,
constitutional rules apply to all administrative layers and collective choice
situations arise at each administrative level. This structure developed by
Ostrom accentuates the fact that action arenas are ‘nestled’ in the rules that
are set by other arenas, independently of the question of whether this takes
place in another administrative layer. On the other hand, such administrative
layers are usually established to create just such a context for policy
processes at ‘lower’ levels. Moreover, the analytical separation between the
various types of rules appears in practice difficult to operationalize into
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observable differences. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the application of
policy instruments is a part of the operational level or a part of the collective
level.
A compromise between both interpretations of the term ‘level’ could be
– as in the introduction to this section – to speak about levels within a concept
of ‘multilevel governance’, in which the other level often, but not always, and
not by definition, also has its own characteristic administrative level.
2.5  The ‘advocacy coalition framework’
The ‘advocacy coalition framework’ developed by Sabatier and others was
developed as an answer to the stage model of the policy cycle and to better
understand the relation between ‘technical information’ (expert knowledge)
and the policy process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 117) An ‘advocacy
coalition’ is a collection of actors from both within and outside government
who hold common beliefs and who coordinate their activities to a
considerable degree (Sabatier 1988, 1991). Within a sector of policy – the
‘political subsystem’ – there is usually more than one advocacy coalition
active. In addition, there are actors who are more likely to have objectives that
relate to policy processes than to the content of policy, and these actors are
referred to by Sabatier as political brokers. The characteristic features of
coalitions are their political convictions or ‘policy beliefs’ and the resources
they have, which lead to the proposed strategy and instruments of the
coalition. The decisions that result from the policy process provide
implementing organizations with both policy lines and resources. The actors
in the subsystem are influenced by resources and restrictions from without
the subsystem, which in turn arise out of more or less stable conditions and
events elsewhere in the system.
In the development of the model much more attention has generally
been paid to the aspect of policy beliefs than to the aspect of resources. Only
recently have Fenger & Klok (1998) developed a connection between the
model and resource dependence, which has been enthusiastically received
by Sabatier (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 141). For our purposes it is
important that the allocation of resources to the implementing organizations is
explicitly recognized to be part of the policy decisions. Besides that, what is of
particular importance is the idea that there are coalitions of actors in the
policy network that do not just simply represent the division between
government and other actors, but contain actors from both of these groups
and are based on common beliefs.
Regarding the beliefs of actors, we can identify various layers. In the
‘deep core’ are issues relating to fundamental values. The ‘policy core’
contains positions relating to the perception of problems, the division of the
costs of policy implementation, the desirability of contributions from experts,
politicians and the general public and other relevant values and preferences.
The ‘derived aspects’ contain elaborations for each given situation. Besides
this layered structure what is also important to us is the importance that is
attached to the perception of the problem.
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2.6  The position so far
We have noted that no completely new elements have been added to the
model of governance. But is has been possible to improve on the five
elements and make them operational. In its shortest form the ‘governance
model’ consists of five questions: Where? Who? What? How? and With
what? A characteristic feature of modern ‘governance’ systems is that they
have many aspects. They are: multilevel, multi-actor, multifaceted, multi-
instrumental and multi-resource-based.
1. Levels of governance – Where? – multilevel –
[Which levels are related to the sector and to what degree? How are the
relations between the levels organized?]
2. Actors in the policy network – Who? – multi-actor –
[Which actors have access to the network? What is their position? Are there
actors that take on the role of process broker? What is the position of the
general public versus experts versus politicians?]
3. Beliefs and objectives – What? – multifaceted –
[What is seen as a problem and how serious is this thought to be? What are
thought to be the causes of the problem? What values and other preferences
are considered to be under threat? What are the policy objectives?]
4. Strategies and instruments – How? – multi-instrumental –
[Which instruments belong to the policy strategy? What are the
characteristics of these instruments? When are they deployed (timing)? How
are the costs and benefits of the policy allocated?]
5. Responsibilities and resources for implementation – With what? – multi-
resource-based –
[Which organizations are responsible for implementing the policy? Which
resources are made available to these organizations by the policy?]
The next section reviews a few other approaches, which may be seen partly
as precursors to the perspectives examined above. The discussion will
concentrate on aspects that can be used to improve on the operationalization
of the five elements, asking ourselves each time whether the approach can
really contribute something extra to the model.
2.7  Some other approaches
Synoptic rationality, bounded rationality, incrementalism and mixed scanning
(Simon, Lindblom, Etzioni)
It may be strange to begin this treatment of a series of approaches with one
that we describe mainly in order to reject it, namely the approach based on
fully rational choice. In particular, the premises that the decision maker has
unambiguous preferences and complete information are invalid.
It was the Nobel prize winner for economics Herbert A. Simon (1997
(1945)) who provided the most famous criticism of these premises. His view
of mankind is not that of an all-knowing ‘Homo economicus’ with clear and
confident preferences, but of a being with a ‘bounded rationality’. While the
concept of rational decision making only refers to the decision making
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process itself, and not the context, ‘bounded rationality’ takes account of the
limitations in the capacity of actors to collect and process information.
Lindblom’s ‘incrementalism’ (Lindblom 1959; Braybrooke & Lindblom
1970 (1963)) also assumes a limited human capacity to process information.
In addition, it devotes much attention to the power of continuity (see next
section) and for the character of pluralistic processes geared to political
negotiations. This approach also pays attention to the interaction between
‘values’ and ‘facts’. These feature again, more prominently, in the cognitive
approaches, which are examined at the end of this section.
‘Mixed scanning’ (Etzioni 1967) is primarily meant to be a description of
the process of policy development (either in a normative sense or not). It
offers little extra of relevance to the context of governance. Opening up the
possibilities of non-incremental policy changes has to do, for example, with
‘megapolicy changes’ (cf. Dror 1971). This fits in with the previously
mentioned cognitive approaches, with their frames, maps of reality, etc.
Bureaucracy and politics (Allison)
In his groundbreaking work Allison (1971) attempts to explain the course of
the Cuban missile crisis in three ways. He, too, starts with the model of the
rational actor, not only to determine his own position but also to provide an
initial explanation of the process. This allows him to present the added value
of discussing and using the other two explanatory models with extra clarity.
The ‘bureaucracy model’ (following Allison’s example) specifically
addresses the standard approaches and repertoires of organizations, which
restrict flexibility in conducting policy. The model has some aspects in
common with elements of our governance model: it goes into the role of
organizations at various levels; it is also one of the few approaches that
explicitly addresses the organization of implementation. In the construction of
objectives it addresses the phenomenon of ‘solutions in search of a problem’
(compare the flow model, examined below), an aversion to risky measures
(dealing with uncertainty) and the organizations’ own management objectives.
The ‘political negotiation’ model (à la Allison) looks at the positions,
interests and mutual power relations between actors (in so far as these do not
relate to the game itself). The reasoning in terms of power in the interaction
process approach (see above) are based on this model.
Flows and garbage cans (Kingdon)
Decision making does not always follow an orderly procedure but sometimes
seems more like a process of fermentation in a compost heap (‘garbage can’
model of Cohen and others 1972), in which various issues come together by
chance. The flow model of the policy process (Kingdon 1995 (1984)) builds
further on this and examines how three relatively autonomous flows come
together each time a decision has to be made. Political ‘entrepreneurs’
promote this by making use of ‘windows of opportunity’ (or creating them).
These three flows consist of problem perceptions, ideas for possible policies
and political ‘salience’ for the voters and those elected, and of the people who
emphasize each of these three or parts of them.
It is tempting to link these three flows to our elements ‘beliefs and
objectives’, ‘strategies and instruments’ and ‘actors in the network’. With
respect to this it should be noted that that Kingdon considers the three flows
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more as notions than as matters of fact (Zahariadis 1999: 74-78) (see also
the subjectivist approaches discussed below). We should also note that
where we emphasize more or less stable features of policy sectors in the
governance model, to allow comparisons to be made between sectors,
Kingdon looks instead at the changeability of these features with regard to
individual subjects of decision making. Nevertheless, the three elements
mentioned allow the issues Kingdon wants to highlight to be accommodated.
Conversely, reasoning from the governance model to the flows model,
the following can be added to the requirements that have to be met if a policy
is to be amended. The convergence of problem perception, policy
opportunities and political salience should not take place at different levels
(as, for example, when there is concern about a problem at the national level
while solutions are being sought at the European level). Moreover, it is
necessary that ideas for solutions include ideas about the management and
allocation of tools and resources for implementation. Otherwise, an issue will
lead to a policy decision (and thrown out of the ‘open window’ and so be
removed from the political agenda), but that decision will only result in a
symbolic policy.
Real games (Scharf)
In his recent overview of policy science approaches, Sabatier (1999)
classifies the game theory of Scharf (1997) with the institutional rational
choice approach (see above). There is something to be said for this, but still,
Scharf and co. highlight a few points left out by Ostrom and co. Scharf calls
his approach ‘actor centered institutionalism’. Besides links to the Ostrom
approach, it is true that much attention is paid to the ‘actor constellations’.
The goal and structure of the approach appear similar to that of the
instrument theory, namely that the course and outcome of the processes are
explained, but without being specially concerned with one of the five elements
of governance as outcome. The most important difference from the
instrument theory is that the outcome to be explained is related to the
question of whether those involved can cooperate or not, while the instrument
theory mainly tries to explain the relation between the inputs and the outputs
of the process. The explanation takes place primarily in terms of the
distribution of preferences for alternatives. Much attention is also paid to
information, but only to direct information and not so much to frameworks for
interpretation (see below). Further, the approach is based primarily on
individual rational actors, although other values are also taken into account.
Cognitive maps, ‘discourses’, ‘frames’, argumentation and cultures (Axelrod,
Dryzek, Fischer, Schön, Thompson & Wildavsky e/o.)
A large number of current theories in policy sciences can be characterized as
cognitive approaches. Characteristic for these theories is that they all
emphasize that the behavior of actors rests on their subjective interpretation
of reality and furthermore that this subjective interpretation is formed because
observations of actors are given a place in frameworks of interpretation that
provide meaning to these observations, but also distort them. Such
frameworks of interpretation can be partially viewed as a form of dealing with
uncertainty. To depart in analysis from an ‘objective’ context as assessed by
the researcher, leads in this vision to false analyses, because not the facts
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but the interpretations count in reality. So, is sense as a contexts of decision-
making not the facts, but the interpretations are ‘true’. Think of the well known
adagio: ‘What is believed to be real is real in its consequences’.
In the layered ‘policy beliefs’ of Sabatier one finds a partial sediment of
these theories. That doesn’t mean however that the has very much respect
for these theories. In his recent work he assesses some of these as still too
vague to be regarded as a real theory. For this reason he doesn’t deal with
them in his book (Sabatier 1999: 11). The differences between the various
theories are to be found especially in the way in which the frameworks of
interpretation are conceptualized. In this respect one can observe a certain
tendency from more individual to more collective frameworks of interpretation.
Axelrod (1976) write about the ‘cognitive maps’ of political elites. For
him the emphasis of the cognitive map is on those aspects that decision-
makers are able to recognize in a certain situation and on the complex web of
causal relationships that they think is linking these aspects. Because the
various cognitive maps of participants in decision-making processes often do
not match it is hard to find a common ground for the exchange of ideas.
Unless one is able to make the cognitive maps more explicit that is.
Schön (1983 and Schön & Rein 1994) starts his analysis from the
viewpoint of the professional, who whether as an actor or as an analyst
creates an image of the situation. According to Schön he does so by building
a ‘frame’ (as framework of interpretation) in which he can ‘store’ his lessons
learnt about the world and his own repertoire of reactions. In this way he is
able to react adequately in the numerous situations in which a fundamental
and thorough analysis is impossible. Needed for this is that the ‘frame’
remains flexible, in other words that new lessons can obtain a place in it and
not only are kept out, when they threaten to disturb the frame. He calls that
‘reflection-in-action’. To make effective communication with others possible
sometimes ‘cross frame discourse’ is needed, in which the participants try to
escape the limitations of their own frame and try to learn to understand the
frame of the others in order to better understand the interpretations of them.
Necessary condition is an open societal debate.
Fischer (1985, 1995 and with Forrester 1993) concentrated initially
especially on the various layers of values that play a role in the assessment
process in evaluation. In the layer of the policy goals one can seek optimal
realization. But it is also possible to criticize the policy goals themselves from
the perspective of general norms than one if thinking relevant to the situation.
In doing so also the role of government itself can become a topic. These
norms can in their turn be judged from the perspective of the central values of
society. And even these can be subject to further evaluation in culture or
social critique. In his later work emphasis is more on the ‘social construction’
of reality. In other words: the way in which a society views reality is regarded
as a sort of implicit agreement.
Dryzek (1987, 1997)  views frameworks of interpretation as
‘discourses. Characteristic for a discourse is that it is not only a set of point of
attention, assumptions and judgements. The discourse is also linked with
specific language expressions. Because different words and metaphors are
used it is extra difficult to communicate crossing the borders between
discourses. In that way discourses can also become both stabilized and rigid.
The frameworks of interpretation are thus not only ‘social constructions’. They
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are also a sort of ‘story that we tell each other about how the world works’
(Milbrath 1993).
Thompsom & Wildavsky e/o. (Thompsom, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990,
Schwarz & Thompsom 1990) build upon the cultural anthropologic approach
of Mary Douglas. Their ‘cultural theory’ discerns four (sometimes five) cultural
positions on the basis of two dimensions that represent the relation between
the individual and society: ‘grid’ and ‘group’. A precise explanation of these
two concepts would be too demanding for our purpose, but they have among
others consequences for the way in which the role of government is judged.
The resulting cultural positions are also called ‘biases’ because the induce an
inclination to interpreted reality consequently in a certain way. The result is
that frameworks of interpretation in this view are not seen as specific for
certain actors in relation to a certain topic, but in principle as belonging to a
fixed attitude of persons, groups or even complete societies. Admittedly in
later work this strong linkage of various frames of interpretation to one
common collective cultural bias have been relaxed.
For our model the above theories have the consequence that we will pay
attention in the first element to the access to the societal debate and the
acceptance of the role of government. With the problem perception there
should be attention for the images of reality that act as filters with the
interpretation of observations and for the degree to which uncertainties are
accepted as one of the indicators for the degree in which one is in need of
such images in order to prevent a feeling of uncertainty. With the strategies it
is important to view whether the chosen instruments provide incentives to
learn, in other words to exceed existing images of reality. Often for that
purpose flexible instruments and indirect steering methods are used.
2.8  A model of governance in five elements
At the end of this part of the paper we come to the conclusion that the
approaches examined have added some specifications to the identified five
elements of governance, but that these in themselves remain intact. Based
partly on the previous discussion and partly on a slightly more detailed
representation of the specifications from the previously examined
approaches, we arrive at the following description of the five elements of the
governance structure we have identified.
(1) Levels of governance
Where? – multilevel –
Which levels of governance dominate policy and the debate on conducting
policy, and in which relations? What is the relation with the administrative
levels of government? Who decides or influences such issues? How is the
interaction between the various administrative levels arranged?
(2) Actors in the policy network
Who? – multi-actor –
How open is the policy arena in theory and practice, and to whom? Who is
actually involved and with what exactly? What is their position? What is the
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accepted role for government? Who have relevant ownership and use rights
or are stakeholders in some other capacity (including policy implementing
organizations)? What is the structural inclination to cooperate among actors in
the network? Are there actors among them who operate as process brokers
or ‘policy entrepreneurs’? What is the position of the general public versus
experts versus politicians?
(3) Problem perception and objectives
What – multifaceted –
What are the dominant maps of reality? What is seen as a problem and how
serious is this considered to be? What do people see as the causes of this
problem? Is the problem considered to be a problem for individuals or a
problem for society as a whole? What values and other preferences are
considered to be at stake? Which functions are allocated to the sector? Is the
problem seen as a relatively new and challenging topic or as a topic in the
‘management’ phase without much political ‘salience’? To what degree is
uncertainty accepted? Where are the recognized points of intervention? What
relations with other policies fields are recognized as coordination topics?
Which policy objectives are accepted? What are levels to which policy makers
aspire (ambition) in absolute terms (level of standards) and relative terms
(required changes in society)?
(4) Strategy and instruments
How? – multi-instrumental –
Which instruments belong to the policy strategy? What are the characteristics
of these instruments? What are the target groups of the policy and what is the
timing of its application? How much flexibility do the instruments provide? To
what extent are multiple and indirect routes to action used? Are changes in
the ownership and use rights within the sector anticipated? To what extent do
they provide incentives to ‘learn’? What requirements do they place on the
availability of resources for implementation?1 How are the costs and benefits
of the policy distributed?
(5) Responsibilities and resources for implementation
With what? – multi-resource-based –
Which organizations (including government organizations) are responsible for
implementing the policy?  What is the repertoire of standard reactions to
challenges known to these organizations? What authority and other resources
are made available to these organizations by the policy? With what
restrictions?
In the next part of the paper we examine the types of connections that can be
expected between the five elements of the governance structure.
                                           
1 For example, some systems of emission charges or tradable licences may require so much
information that it makes them almost impossible to apply. The fine tuning of the instrument is
very important in this respect, and can make the difference between an effective intervention
and a dead end.
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3 Patterns and dynamics
3.1 Introduction
In this section we describe the relations between the five elements of
governance. The assumed relations between the five elements described in
this paper are based on the basic principle that the elements of policy each
form the context of the other elements and that they will tend to adjust to each
other if not affected by outside influences.
By choosing mutual adjustment as a basic principle, emphasis is
placed on stability rather than change. Nevertheless, such a model also offers
a framework for explaining change. Changes in the external context of factors
that are not considered to be part of the governance model can influence one
or more of the elements. Through the same mechanisms of mutual interaction
this can in turn lead to changes in all the elements of the governance model.
The idea of mutual adjustment also offers the possibility of explaining
differences between the situations in two or more countries, in this case
differences in governance in the field of groundwater protection and drinking
water policy in Florida and the Netherlands. Differences in external factors, for
example in geological and hydrological features, or in solidly grounded
aspects of governance, for example the constitutional allocation of
competences to government authorities, will, according to this idea, indirectly
bring about a series of differences in (other) elements of governance.
There is a certain ‘logical’ relation between the five elements of
governance. This, however, means no more than that it is easy to see why
each previous element imposes harder or softer limitations on aspects of the
following element. In this sense, these influences create a situation in which
the elements are adjusted to suit each other. In our opinion, however, there is
no a priori reason for thinking that the mutual influences between the
elements is restricted to this alone. In principle, the idea of mutual adjustment
means that there is every reason to believe that all 25 mutual influences are
possible. All elements form the context for the others and can therefore be
both independent and dependent variables. This means that we can
distinguish 25 hypotheses.
3.2  Premises
The premises and mechanisms that lie at the heart of these hypotheses are
as follows.
(1) The best predictor of the status of an element at t2 is its status at t1. Each
change takes up energy and will not take place if the governance system is in
balance. Only changes in other situations (within and outside the ‘governance
system’ and via the efforts of the actors) can bring about changes. This idea
forms the basis for the five ‘continuation’ hypotheses, in which an element
influences itself.
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(2) The elements in the model mentioned earlier form a more or less limiting
or determining context for later elements. The division of the conduct of policy
between administrative levels activates networks that are active primarily at
these levels. Those participating in these policy networks are, of course,
those who give shape to the perception of the problem and the ambitions in
the public debate and subsequently in the policy itself. These in turn are the
focus of the discussion about policy strategies, for one reason because
certain actors are considered to be a target group while others are not an
because certain intervention points in the policy field are utilized while others
are not. The selected strategies and the instruments that are part of these in
turn require the availability of an implementation structure and resources to
make implementation possible (see also footnote 1 by the diagram below).
These ideas form the basis for the four ‘logical order’ hypotheses. The five
elements form a sort of cascade of influence.
(3) This ‘logical order’ of influence, however, is not the only way in which
(changes in) elements of the ‘governance cascade’ can influence each other.
In fact, we believe that all the other conceivable 16 relations are possible,
including the influence of elements mentioned later on earlier mentioned
elements. All 25 relations should be considered, for example to analyze
clusters of related differences between Florida and the Netherlands, because
it is possible that the influence of the ‘network’ on the strategy works via the
influence of the former on the ‘ambition’, etc.
(4) The general idea behind all these relations is that they promote the mutual
adjustment of elements. According to this idea, dynamics will always have an
external sources, which may consist of (a) major social developments, such
as demographic, cultural, economic or physical (technological and spatial)
developments, and (b) developments in other policy fields (Ligteringen 1998:
214-215 and following).
(5) All these mutual influences do not occur of themselves but need
processes of social interaction to bring them about. In the description of the
governance system here, however, we do not explore further the process side
of the system, but only go into the elements that are (re)produced by these
processes (as outputs of processes) and which in turn again form a context
for other processes (as inputs to processes). By accepting that the relations
actually work through processes of social interaction means that we can best
explore the assumed relations between the elements on the basis of what we
see as the central factors in such processes (Bressers 1983; Bressers & Klok
1987a, 1987b; Kuks 1987; Klok 1991).
(6) An adjustment may take place along three possible perspectives, referring
to: objectives (‘desire’, ultimate basis: values), information (‘knowledge’,
ultimate basis: cognition) and power (‘ability’, ultimate basis: resources). The
mechanism of mutual adjustment, distributed over the five elements of the
governance system, will tend to make values consistent, to make cognitions
fit better into a common framework for interpretation and to make resources
act to mutually facilitate the elements. But take note: just as in mechanism 1
and 2, these are not compulsory determinants but probabilistic influences,
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taken for the moment to be preliminary working hypotheses. In essence, the
influences also play a role in the ‘logical order’ of the elements in the model.
(7) In principle, of course, every relation can be conceived as working from all
three perspectives described above. An attempt will be made to do this later.
Before we discuss each hypothesis separately we examine the three
perspectives (desire, knowledge, ability).
3.3  Values, cognitions and resources
Why are objectives, information and power (with values, cognition and
resources in the background) the useful perspectives when examining the
relations between the five elements of the governance model? As we have
indicated above this has to do with the fact that the relations between the
elements are brought about by processes of social interaction. These three
perspectives have proved themselves to be exceptionally useful in explaining
the dynamics of such processes. In his thesis Bressers (1983: 1898-197)
attempts to indicate why these three in particular are essential. He first looks
at what is needed to make a relatively simple object: making a chair requires
the carpenter to have an object in mind, and it requires expertise and
resources, such as tools and materials. In a multiple-actor process goals also
relate to the position relative to other actors as well as information and
resources (in the form of power). He also considers the long tradition of
thinking in terms of these perspectives (idem: 352-328).
A second way of clarifying the three perspectives is to link them to ideas on
policy instruments. Policy instruments are often classified into rules,
incentives and communication. This, in our opinion, does not so much reflect
different policy instruments but different ways in which they exert their
influence. Regulations are not always couched in terms of compulsory rules
but may also work by influencing the outcome of balancing the costs and
benefits of alternative patterns of behavior (incentives) and ensuring that
attention is given to certain alternative forms of behavior (communication).
Subsidies are not only incentives, but are also linked to conditions (rules) and
information (communication) as well. Communication, certainly two-way
communication, often leads to agreements being made, such as covenants or
voluntary agreements (rules) and the exchange of concessions, for example
acceptance of change in exchange for flexible timing (incentives). In other
words, these are aspects of all policy instruments rather than separate groups
of instruments. The fact that this classification of instruments still remains so
important has more to do with their connections with the perspectives based
on societal interaction processes than with their usefulness for this purpose.
A third way of illustrating their rich significance is to relate the three
perspectives to social science disciplines. There is a certain connection
between these disciplines and the three perspectives mentioned above. This
connection is partial, though, and relates to the core principles of these
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disciplines rather than any details, making a distinction in principle between
individual and social methods of considerations.
The fundamental concept in economics is the scarcity of resources and
the decisions and bartering that result from this. In its most classical version,
the complexities of all other aspects (the social, cognitive and value aspects)
are reduced to assumptions of ‘methodological individualism’, ‘complete
information’ and ‘individual behavior that maximizes benefits’. If ‘benefit’
cannot simply be equated with money, multiple objectives are formulated, for
example ‘bureaucrats strive to obtain as large a budget as possible’. This is,
in essence, an unethical and pragmatic premise. So, to sum up: ‘A: that which
gives the greatest benefit will be chosen.’
In political science the social aspect of the distribution of resources,
and so the power of one actor over another, are emphasized. Reasoning,
then, is about the question of who is going to dominate the field. To sum up:
‘B: Whoever has the most power is free to choose.’
Sociology is partly about understanding social problems and
psychology is partly about human skill in collecting and processing
information. To sum up: ‘C: It is not the facts that are important, but how what
is observed is interpreted.’ (Or: ‘What is believed to be real is real in its
consequences.’)
Social psychology and communication science emphasize the transfer
of information in mutual communication processes. Also, the role of
information collection and processing is often emphasized in the process of
making choices and power relations (and of the development of values). The
‘argumentative tendency’ in policy sciences (e.g. Hoppe 1999) fits largely into
this track. To sum up: ‘D: Interpretations of reality are the product of a social
construction.’
The value aspect is pivotal in ethics and other areas of philosophy. To
sum up: ‘E: People should want what is good.’
Regarding normative social aspects, imposing values on others, for
example the whole community, we enter the domain of the law. To sum up:
‘F: The limits to what is good are set by rules.’
Of course, this characterization of perspectives (and certainly of associated
disciplines) is too simple when forced into a simple matrix. Each scientific
discipline can borrow elements from the other cells. In doing so, though, it is
often clear that they reject some of their own principles and integrate some of
the principles of other social sciences into their own set of considerations.
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Scientific Perspectives Individual Social
Resources (power) a. Choosing the greatest
benefit
b. Those with most
power can choose
Cognitions (information) c. It is not the facts that
are important but how
what is observed is
interpreted
d. Interpretations of
reality are the product of
social construction
Values (objectives) e. People should want
what is good
f. The limits to what is
good are set by rules
All in all, the above shows, in our opinion, the value and significance of
following these perspectives when quite a complete picture is required of the
relations between social science concepts, such as the elements of the
governance system identified by us. After this account of the power and
significance of the three perspectives used in this paper, we now formulate
the assumptions and hypotheses used in this study.
3.4  Assumptions
Main assumption: The influences that the five elements of governance exert
on each other will promote the mutual adjustment of these elements in a
governance system.
Subsidiary assumption: Changes within a governance system occur because
other factors ‘from outside’ alter characteristic features of one or more of the
five elements to a greater or lesser degree, and the other elements adjust
themselves to this.
The main assumption rests on three mechanisms. These can be formulated
as secondary assumptions and applied in the formulation of the hypotheses
with regard to the relations between elements of governance.
Secondary assumption 1: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the tendency towards an increase in the
mutual consistency of the values that play a role in these elements if there are
no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 2: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the tendency of the cognition that plays
a role in these elements to fit into a common framework for interpretation if
there are no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 3: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the dependence in each of these
elements on resources from the other elements.  
The hypotheses that are based on these assumptions are informative and not
tautological because, in the first place, it is conceivable that ‘disturbances
from outside’ are so numerous nowadays that the tendencies listed are not
recognizable in the empirical data, even when they are in principle not
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incorrect. In the second place, the core ideas can also be questioned, for
example from a ‘post-modern’ perspective in which the autonomous tendency
towards fragmentation and coexistence of values and cognition is
emphasised.
The hypotheses are testable because the mutual relations between the
elements, both in comparisons between cases and comparisons in time, can
be mapped and can be compared with what is to be expected according to
the hypotheses. To this end it is necessary to specify the expected relations
between the elements of governance using all three mechanisms at the same
time. This will be done in the next two sections, which are followed by a
summary table.
3.5 ‘Top-down’ influences: relations in the stated order of governance
elements
The ‘continuation’ and ‘logical order’ relations will not be further elaborated. In
fact, naturally comparable perspectives form the basis these relations rather
than the relations discussed below, which we now discuss in turn. The arrows
indicate that the first named element in this hypothesis has an influence on
the second named element.
Level → Problem and ambition
From the value perspective we can expect that the sort of values that
characterize a certain level of administration will work through in the
perception of the problem and the policy ambition. Many values are not
peculiar to a particular administrative level, but the administrative level
provides an indication of the level at which equality or balance is sought.
From the cognitive perspective (interpretation frameworks) the problem will be
perceived at the level from which it is viewed. The problem of waste, for
example, looks different at the national level (eg safe processing) than at the
local level (eg impact of waste processing plants).
From the perspective of resources the dominant level, as ‘owner’ of the
problem, will tend to conduct the debate about the problem and policy
ambition as it affects that level. If there are other levels that have a strong
position this may lead to fragmentation of the perception of the problem and
policy ambition. In the end, the composition of aspects that play a role in the
perception of the problem and policy ambition will be partly determined by the
status of the various levels.
Level → Strategies
From the perspective of values, there are not many values linked to the
selection of the administrative level, except the values held at the level at
which a balance is desired (equality). The choice of strategy will reflect this.
From the cognitive perspective, strategies will be developed primarily for
dealing with the problem at the level at which the policy is being developed or
at least from which there is a clear view of the problem. If governance is
divided between a number of levels, policy strategies will be developed at
more than one level.
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From the resources/dominance perspective there will be a tendency to select
policy strategies that do not threaten the distribution of responsibilities for
developing policy at the various levels. In the end, we see here, too, that the
characteristics of the chosen strategies will to a certain extent reflect the
distribution of responsibilities between the various levels.
Level → Resources
This concerns a big leap over the more stepwise relations between these two
elements. This means that there may not be much left for a direct influence of
one element over the other.
From the values perspective an attempt will be made to create a certain
balance, not only in the way the problem is tackled but also in the allocation of
resources between the various subareas of the administrative levels.
From the cognitive perspective the allocation of resources will mainly reflect
what the problem is perceived to be, but this is an indirect relation via the
problem perception.
From the resources perspective, the resources distributed will mainly be those
that are available at the level concerned.
Network → Strategies
Here the ‘network–instrumentation model’ is relevant (Bressers 1993;
Bressers & O’Toole 1999; Ligteringen 1999), which deals with aspects of
objectives, information/approachability and power/resources.
From the values perspective strategies will be selected that are appropriate to
the degree of consistency between the values held by the actors.
From the cognitive perspective it is important whether the government and
target groups (representatives) develop an interpretation framework through a
process of negotiation or that there are ‘difficult to reach’ target groups.
From the resources perspective what is important is the question of the extent
to which the party conducting policy is dominant or is strongly dependent on
the cooperation of other actors.
Network → Resources
From the values perspective and from the cognitive perspective the influence
of the composition of the network will probably be transmitted via the problem
perception and policy ambitions.
From the resources perspective the distribution of resources is primarily
influenced by the network because people tend to help others in their own or
allied organizations. This leads to ‘who gets what’ games, irrespective of the
resources needed for certain strategies.
Problem and ambition → Resources
From the values perspective we can expect – irrespective of the objective
resource requirements for the chosen instruments, which is, after all, the line
of ‘logical order’ – that resources will be allocated to those objectives related
to the problem that are perceived to be the most serious (a form of symbolic
allocation). In the world of politics you often see that ‘extra money is provided
for solving the problem of waiting lists in the health service’ without it being
clear what that money can be used for.
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From the cognitive perspective we can expect something similar, but this time
based on the choice of intervention points within the policy field: changeable
causes or symptoms of the problem. Here, too, there is no need of a direct
relation with the activities for which the resources are needed.
From the resources perspective we can expect the global effect that the more
serious the problem and the higher the level of ambition, the total willingness
to acquire the resources will increase.
3.6 ‘Bottom-up’ influences: influences along the feedback flows
In this section the arrows in the headings represent a tendency for the second
named element to adjust to the first named element. In this case, though, the
influences discussed are in the reverse order to the one defined in the ‘logical
order’. For example, the division of resources influences the (further
elaboration of) the strategies instead of the selected strategies influencing the
(distribution of) resources.
Resources → Strategies
From the values perspective we can expect that the method of implementing
policy strategies will be linked to the question of whether sufficient resources
have been made available for the intended implementation. If this is not the
case and resources have to be removed from other tasks to compensate,
then value conflicts will arise, and these will be resolved by not fully
implementing the strategy concerned. In effect, this means changing the
strategy.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the way the strategy and
instruments are interpreted will be influenced by the resources that are made
available. If these resources appear to push the implementation in a certain
direction or influence the effort put into implementing the policy the
conception of what the strategies and instruments are will be adapted to meet
these effects. Because ‘what is believed to be real is real in its consequences’
the strategy will actually be changed.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the resources
made available (and other features of the implementation situation) will be
taken by those executing the strategy as the starting point when determining
how people deal with the strategies and instruments in practice, in many
cases in an attempt to retain as much as possible of the original purpose
(bottom-up argument).
Resources → Problem and ambition
From a values perspective we can expect that the policy ambitions will be
measured partly against the resources made available. If there is a
discrepancy, and, as a result, resources have to be taken away from other
problems, value conflicts will arise and these will be resolved by not
attempting to fulfil the relevant policy ambitions in their entirety. In effect, the
policy ambitions will be changed.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the way the perception of the
problem and the policy ambition are interpreted by those executing the policy
will be influenced by the available resources. If these resources appear to
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push the implementation in a certain direction or influence the effort put into
implementing the policy, the conception of what the primary issue is and what
the actual policy ambitions are will be adjusted. Because ‘what is believed to
be real is real in its consequences’ this will in effect mean a change in the
emphasis placed on aspects of the problem and the ambition of the policy.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that that the
resources made available can also strengthen or weaken the importance of
the position held by those executing the policy with respect to the perception
of the problem and the selection of policy ambitions, and this may influence
later choices. What this all means is that the policy ambitions are extended or
pruned back to fit the available resources.
Resources → Network
From a values perspective we can expect that frustration or satisfaction with
the distribution of resources will influence the motives of the actors in the
network.
From the cognitive perspective we can expect that the actors that have
received most resources will be seen to be the most important actors in the
network, or may even enter the network because they are provided with
resources by other actors for the application of the strategies and
instruments.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the actors in
the network, under the influence of the distribution of resources, will seek to
form coalitions that match this distribution, and may seek to co-operate with
actors that possess resources they do not have and vice versa.
Resources → Level
From a values perspective we can expect the administrative level that
receives the most resources to (continue to) feel most responsibility for the
problem.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect the administrative level receiving
the most resources to strengthen its own interpretation of the problem as one
belonging primarily to that administrative level.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the administrative level
receiving the most resources will, partly as a result of this, retain the strongest
position.
Strategies → Problem and policy ambition
From a values perspective we can expect that those aspects of the problem
that come over most clearly as an object of intervention in the selected
strategy will be considered most important.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the presence of a certain
strategy will make those aspects of the problem most noticeable that are the
clearest objects of intervention.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the selected strategy will
strengthen the position of certain parts of the problem in the debate and
strengthen the position of certain policy ambitions. All in all, there are signs




From a values perspective we can expect that the strategies and instruments
allocate certain responsibilities to actors, as a result of which these actors will
redefine their responsibilities and will then set out to achieve other goals
(compare the gradual influence of the allocation of water quality tasks on the
environmental awareness of the water authorities).
From a cognitive perspective we can expect the features of the chosen
strategies to influence the perception of the way individuals in the network
deal with one another and of who belongs in the network and who does not. A
tough enforcement strategy based on deterrence may lead to a perception
that relations within part of the network are more strained. Consensual
management strategies may bring about the opposite.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the importance
of the role that actors play in the implementation also more generally
influences their relative importance in the network.
Strategies → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the division of responsibilities
between administrative levels associated with a particular strategy influences
what people think about who should have these responsibilities, also
concerning administrative level.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the strategy raises the level
of knowledge of the problem and the possible responses mostly in the
administrative level that has most to do.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the position of the
administrative levels that have a more important role in the selected strategy
will be strengthened relative to other levels. All these phenomena appear to
be present in the Netherlands because of the rise of the target group
approach, which has strengthened the national level (at which most
covenants are agreed) with respect to the provincial and local levels (where
most of the licences are issued and which carry out most of the enforcement
duties).
Problem and policy ambition → Network
From a values perspective we can expect that a multifaceted problem
perception may lead to responsibilities being assigned to, and accepted by,
more actors than in the case of a one-dimensional problem perception.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that a problem perception in
which many actors are viewed to be involved in the problem can lead to more
actors that have the idea that it concerns them than when the problem is
regarded as only the business of a special group.
From a resources perspective we can expect that a problem perception and
policy ambition that are found to be a positive or a negative factor by certain
actors will also assign a special position in the network to these same actors.
All in all we can state that simple problem perceptions can lead to a more
closed network than more fragmented, multifaceted problem perceptions.
Such influences were ascertained in the concluding analysis of the ‘white
book’, in which shifts in the network were related to the challenges put before
the network by the incorporation of the environmental issue and the question
of government funding.
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Problem and policy ambition → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the way in which the problem is
described has implications for the administrative level that ought to feel most
responsible for the problem (see footnote 2 by the diagram below).
From a cognitive perspective we can expect a similar effect to occur regarding
the question of what is considered to be the most suitable administrative level
in the dominant paradigm, given the scale of the problems.
From a resources perspective we can expect that, for a particular problem, a
certain paradigm will strengthen or weaken the relative position of
administrative levels in relation to the others.
Network → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the dominant values of the
actors in the network (as opposed to their own interests) can be relevant for
the distribution of governance over the various levels.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the dominant policy vision of
the actors in the network can be relevant for the distribution of governance
over the various levels.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the dominant actors in the
network will also influence the distribution of governance between the
administrative levels and that this distribution will be a reflection of the relative
position of the dominant actors.
3.7 Summary hypotheses scheme
To conclude this section we present the twenty-five hypotheses, for reasons
of overview in one single scheme. The cells are filled with very short
descriptions that are more meant to provide aids to memory than as a




Level Network Ambition Strategies Resources



















































This hypotheses scheme will be used to analyze the differences between
Florida and the Netherlands concerning their governance patterns regarding
the protection of groundwater and the production of drinking water. This
analysis takes place in the next two sections.
                                           
2 Compare for instance ‘sustainability’ and ‘residential environmental quality’
(leefomgevingskwaliteit).
3 Which means both extra openess for some and closedness for others.
4 Cf. Bressers 1998, Bressers & O’Toole 1998, Ligteringen 1999.
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4 Multilevel groundwater management in Florida and the
Netherlands
4.1  Introduction
Having constructed a model of governance made up of five elements, and
having made our assumptions explicit, we now use this model to analyze our
case and examine the tenability of our assumptions. Our case concerns
policies for the protection of the groundwater and drinking water in Florida and
the Netherlands. Specifically, we examine protection against pollution of the
groundwater by nitrates and pesticides used in agriculture, which can damage
the quality of drinking water. This issue can be broken down into a number of
components, or subproblems. Here, we identify four subproblems that are
linked together, whereby the fourth subproblem precedes the third, the third
precedes the second, and the second the first; a chain of interlocking
problems. Interventions made earlier in the chain (closer to the source) will
act more to prevent the ultimate problem arising. Nevertheless, the core of
the whole issue is the final impact that arises at the end of the chain. The first
subproblem (the final problem) is that contaminated drinking water can
damage the health of the consumer. The second subproblem, which
precedes this, is the entry of contaminated groundwater into the drinking
water supply system. The third subproblem, which precedes the second, is
the contamination of groundwater by a certain form of agricultural land use.
And finally, the fourth subproblem, the root cause of all this, is that the type of
agricultural production pursued requires certain substances in certain
concentrations which become problematic when they leach into the
groundwater.
In principle, a policy response can be devised to address each of the four
subproblems (whichever country is being considered), and each subproblem
can be an intervention point for policy. The further down the problem chain a
policy is applied, the more ‘effect-oriented’ (or ‘end-of-pipe’) it is called; policy
is more ‘source-oriented’ the earlier in the problem chain it is applied. If a
policy is directed at an early stage of the problem chain, at the first two
subproblems, it will address agriculture (farmers) as the land user and
consumer of pesticides and nitrates. If a policy is applied at a later stage of
the problem chain, at the last two subproblems, it will be directed at those
involved in the provision of drinking water (those abstracting the groundwater,
the water companies and consumers). A dual-purpose policy towards the
target groups is therefore conceivable that includes more effect-oriented and
more source-oriented interventions.
We will use these four intervention points as a basis for comparison, not only
to compare Florida and the Netherlands as states but also the five elements
of governance separately for each intervention point. The first intervention
point (§ 4.2) revolves around the consumption of drinking water and
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protecting the consumer using quality standards. The second intervention
point (§ 4.3) revolves around the production and distribution (abstraction) of
drinking water, as well as promoting better management of the source and
supply of drinking water. The third intervention point (§ 4.4) revolves around
the land use (application of pesticides and nitrates in relation to the
groundwater), as well as the protection of groundwater against contamination
through water quality standards and liability for the type of land use. The
fourth intervention point (§ 4.5) revolves around farm management and
promoting better agricultural management, as well as the production and
distribution of pesticides and nitrates.
The information required for this comparison was obtained as follows.
Information for the Netherlands was collected during the course of two
international comparative water management studies. The first of these was
called ‘Networks for Water Policy’ and was funded partly by a subsidy from
the American Council for European Studies. The study was concluded in
1994 with the publication of a special issue of the journal Environmental
Politics (Bressers, O’Toole & Richardson 1994). The second study, ‘Water
Supply Authorities Preventing Agricultural Water Pollution’, was funded by the
EU’s Fourth Framework Programme and resulted in  the publication of a book
(Schrama 1998). The material used in this study is drawn from these
publications (Bressers, Huitema & Kuks 1994; Kuks 1998a, 1998b).
For Florida, the information was obtained from 80 interviews with the
relevant people in Florida conducted by one of the authors during the autumn
of 1995 while he was a guest researcher at the University of Florida in
Gainesville. Additional information was obtained from reports by other
researchers, government documents, documents produced by other
organizations and further information obtained from the Internet.
Despite the considerable similarity between Florida and the Netherlands in
relevant policy areas such as the hydrology and the importance of agriculture,
including the risks this has for the groundwater, etc., there are also various
differences between the two areas. Within the scope of this paper we focus
primarily on the differences to be found in the multilevel nature of the pattern
of governance in each of the three subsectors. As we have shown in section
3, we assume that the elements of the pattern of governance are not
independent of each other. This means that many of the differences between
the two areas in this regard will also be connected. If all the differences could
be explained entirely by differences in the other elements of governance, or
were a consequence of other differences, then it would not matter which
difference we took as the starting point of the analysis. However, we do not
wish to go that far.
For each topic we begin by analyzing the extent to which there is a
difference in the distribution of governance between the various scale-levels.
Taking this difference as our starting point we will examine which differences
in other elements of governance are related to this and then which other
elements of governance may further the differences in governance between
levels.
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4.2  Quality standards for drinking water and the treatment of groundwater
Scale-levels
Regarding quality standards for drinking water and the treatment of
groundwater the distribution of governance over different administrative levels
is in many respects the same in both areas. Both the American federal
government and the European Union impose minimum standards for the
quality of drinking water. These standards are comparable and global experts,
particularly from the World Health Organization, have played an important
role in developing them. In the ‘translation’ of these standards to the level of
the (member) state (Florida and the Netherlands) there have been no great
differences either. In both states, the standards are applied to the drinking
water companies. There appears to be a uniformity of approach, but this is
deceptive. There is a small difference, but with significant consequences.
There are quite big differences in the way the water companies
themselves operate, which has important consequences for the pattern of
governance. In the Netherlands all the water supply companies have
sufficient public support for using a variety of sources of water and,
eventually, for making use of advanced water purification techniques so that
meeting the drinking water quality standards is not in danger – at least not in
the short term, and as long as people are prepared to pay considerably more
for their water. In Florida a distinction has to be made between the urban and
the rural areas. The urban areas are served by large water companies, but in
the rural areas most drinking water is supplied by very small companies, or is
even entirely decentralized and in the hands of (small groups of) end users; in
contrast, the largest water companies in the Netherlands are found in the
rural areas. Because of the decentralized production of drinking water in the
Florida countryside it is often impossible to meet stricter quality standards by
mixing water from different sources or turning to alternative sources. As a
result the quality standards are by no means always met.
Consequences
The consequences of this are not to be found in the first instance in the
element of the actors in the network. We have already seen that within the
relevant network it is the key actors, even the global WHO, who play a
dominant role.
But there are recognizable clear consequences for the perception of
the problem and policy ambition. Because in Florida meeting the quality
standards cannot be guaranteed in all cases, the public debate has stressed
the health risks to consumers. It is also seen as a live issue, not a future
threat. This has been boosted by incentives from outside the governance
system in the form of incidents of contaminated drinking water which have
attracted much media attention. In contrast, in the Netherlands there is hardly
any such concern. The water supply companies do make use of predictions
that a number of well will become unsuitable for use if pollution of the
groundwater continues unchanged to make a case for a preventive approach
to dealing with groundwater contamination (Bressers, Kuks & Huitema 1994:
34). They have been successful in getting this problem on the political agenda
as one of sustainability rather than public health. This other perception of the
problem has also led to different ambitions regarding the objectives of policy,
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which in the Dutch case is no longer targeted at the consumers of
groundwater but at the polluters.
Of course this has also had consequences for the strategies followed
and the instruments used. In the Netherlands this has led to great emphasis
being placed on preventive measures geared to restricting any further
contamination of the groundwater. Indirectly, there have also been
consequences for the network because their initiative has, in a number of
cases, given the water companies a role in the implementation of this
preventive policy. Given that this preventive policy in fact belongs to the next
two subjects to be treated in this section, these issues are not discussed
further here. In Florida, however, part of the strategy pursued has been to fit
additional filters at the wells that do not meet the quality standards,
particularly where pesticides are the main cause of the contamination.
Regarding the responsibilities and resources for implementation it can
be stated that, based on the information on the quality of the individual
sources supplied by the counties, the engineering department of Florida state
itself visits the water supplier to fit the required equipment. The financial and
information costs of this strategy are very high, and a high level of resources
are needed. There is, in fact, insufficient money and time for a systematic
monitoring of the quality of the decentrally produced drinking water. This
phenomenon is not unique to Florida, and has prompted the federal
government to establish a subsidy programme to encourage improvements in
the quality of the small-scale drinking water supplies. Although this involves
no formal shift in competence between administrative levels, it nevertheless
indicates a gradually more active attitude at the federal level.
And this brings us back again to the beginning of the governance model. We
now look at the difference in levels we remarked on at the start from the other
side: where does this difference come from? And why have large water
companies become established in the rural areas in the Netherlands and not
in Florida?
Background
We begin our brief review of the background to this in both states with an
aspect that lies outside the governance model: the geographical and
demographic circumstances. Although Florida is a relatively densely
populated state by American standards, the Florida countryside is
considerably more sparsely populated than areas considered to be rural in
the Netherlands. This is further heightened by the fact that a large part of the
Florida population lives in the big cities of Miami, Tampa/St. Petersburg and
Jacksonville. As a result, it is much commoner for small communities and
some individual farms to be so far from a water mains that connection to a
mains water supply would be prohibitively expensive.
In addition to this factor we return again to the actors in the network.
Since 1975 the Dutch provinces have played an active role in bringing about a
series of water company mergers (Bressers, Kuks & Huitema 1994: 30-31).
One of the reasons behind this was the belief that bigger companies would be
better able to guarantee a high standard of drinking water than the many
small companies there were previously. The provinces derived their authority
to stimulate such mergers partly from private law, as shareholders in the
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companies. The provinces were also able to influence the water companies in
which municipalities held shares through their supervisory role over the
municipalities. However, the role of the provinces was mainly one of taking
the initiative and leading the way in meetings between the parties involved. If
a government authority were to assumed such a supervisory over a business
sector in Florida it would probably not be so readily accepted.
In addition to the generally much lower level of tolerance towards
government authority in the United States than in Europe, and certainly in the
Netherlands, perhaps the element of the perception of the problem also plays
a role. More so than in the Netherlands, many people living in the rural areas
of Florida believe that groundwater, by definition, is ‘purer’ than water that has
been subjected to all sorts of industrial treatment. This is best illustrated by
the positive image many people have in the Netherlands of ‘spring water’ or
‘mineral water’, while ‘groundwater’ is more readily associated with all sorts of
risky soil pollution, making thorough control of the quality of the water by
experts and water companies a highly desirable thing. The image that many
people in Florida have of groundwater as ‘mineral water’ means there is little
public tolerance of intervention  by public authorities.
4.3 Preventing contaminated groundwater being used in the drinking water
supply
Scale-levels
For this topic the federal/EU level hardly plays a role in either state. In both
states there is a system whereby water abstraction areas are defined in
relation to the supply of drinking water. In the Netherlands this task is carried
out by the provinces, and these water abstraction areas must be reflected in
municipal land use plans. In Florida the five Water Management Districts
(WMDs) are responsible for designating areas together with the counties,
which visit the small producers and advise the WMDs. All in all, there appears
to be no significant difference between Florida and the Netherlands regarding
the division of responsibilities between the various administrative levels. In
both cases the lower level has quite an important but secondary task, and the
emphasis lies with the intermediate level between the state and the local
community. The consequences of identifying areas, though, are different in
the two states: in the Netherlands this leads to additional restrictions designed
to protect the quality of the groundwater; in Florida this leads to extra
restrictions on the use of groundwater.
Actually, we could end the discussion of this subtopic now because we
have already concluded that there is no difference in the distribution of
multilevel governance between the various administrative levels. But although
there may be no ‘objective’ difference, there is a ‘subjective’ difference, and
that makes it interesting to dwell a little longer on this topic. In the Netherlands
it is considered quite normal to draw up physical plans and designate special
areas at the national level, in outline at least, and then to specify these further
at the provincial level and finally fill them in in detail at the local level. The
distribution of multilevel governance regarding the designation of groundwater
protection areas fits into this picture and so does not invite further debate. In
Florida the more or less equal division of responsibilities between the various
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administrative levels, however, is seen as a step towards more centralized
control. Here, the basic approach is not top-down, but bottom-up. In principle,
all responsibilities lie at the local level and interference by higher
administrative levels is soon considered inappropriate. The consequences of
there not being a difference in the allocation of responsibilities between
administrative levels cannot, of course, be investigated; but it may be
interesting to examine how, despite the difference principles at work in
Florida, it has been possible to arrive at such an equal division of
responsibilities.
Background
Looked at from the position of the actors in the network what stands out is
that there is no question local administrators closing ranks against the
increasing influence of the state and the WMDs. Local administrators and
local water suppliers in the countryside may not be happy, but the urban
administrations and the large drinking water companies are much less
dismissive of the situation.
The background to this lies in the perception of the problem at hand,
particularly the interplay between the quality and quantity aspects. The
enormous growth of the cities, which all happen to lie on the coast, makes the
principle that every local community takes care of meeting its own water
needs untenable. Abstracting groundwater to supply drinking water to the big
cities like Miami and Tampa would quickly lead to falling water tables and
result in the penetration of salt water from the sea into the subsoil. To prevent
salination of the groundwater it is important to be able to import water from
inland areas to supply the cities. This requires coordination at a level higher
than the local administrations (i.e. coordination at state level) and an
approached based on hydraulic engineering principles (ie implementation by
the five big Water Management Districts). This is in the interests of both the
big cities and the continuity of the larger urban water companies.
4.4 Emissions to the groundwater and restrictions placed on agricultural
activities
Scale-levels
In this discussion we restrict ourselves initially to contamination by nitrates. At
the state level, both Florida and the Netherlands have quality standards for
groundwater. However, there is an important difference. In the Netherlands
the nitrate standards are imposed by the European Union and can be
enforced by the EU. The Netherlands is obliged to implement these standards
and to check whether they are being adhered to. In Florida the drinking water
quality standards have been adopted voluntarily as standards for nitrate in
groundwater. The federal government of the USA does nothing in this
respect, but is not so silent when it comes to contamination by pesticides.
Consequences
Regarding the actors in the network, this has repercussions for the relations
between actors who represent the interests of the environment and those who
represent the interests of farmers. In the national debate the environmental
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movement and other actors who defend environmental interests in the
Netherlands can always fall back on externally fixed standards, and so those
opposing firm measures are forced to make a strong case that more lenient
measures can also achieve the stated goal. It proved almost impossible for
them to depart from the goal itself once European standards had been
introduced, something they had succeed in doing for some time. In Florida
representatives from the farming community were not bound by such
limitations because the standards were set at their ‘own’ state level and so
could be relaxed.
This brings us to the area of problem perception and policy ambition.
Because there is little influence from environmental groups, certainly
regarding nitrates in groundwater, occasional excessive use of fertilizers in
Florida is not seen primarily as a problem of pollution by farmers but rather as
a question of sensible business management (or not). As a consequence,
restrictions on emissions do not readily spring to mind when setting policy
objectives. In terms of strategy and instruments this has not resulted in the
imposition of emission standards on farmers in Florida; instead, Florida has a
somewhat curious instrument called the ‘curative liability’. This means that if it
can be proven that the levels of nitrate in the groundwater are too high as a
result of the activities of one or more individual farmers, these farmers can be
held liable for the damage. However, it is incredibly difficult, and in many
cases impossible, to trace such cause–effect relationships back to individual
farmers.
In effect, this instrument requires such a high level of resources to
implement (information and/or money) that in most cases it is impossible to
apply to cases of nitrate pollution in the groundwater. In practice, therefore, it
is a very weak instrument for changing farming practices, and is a mere
formality.
Background
If we look into the background of the passive role adopted by American
federal administrative level regarding the emission of nitrates we quickly come
to the different development stages and meta-policy (transcending the
atmosphere surrounding groundwater protection and other policy areas) of
the USA and the EU during the 1980s. While in America the Reaganite New
Federalism set out to push back the boundaries of government, particularly at
the federal level, similar developments took place in Europe mainly at the
level of the nation state. At the EU level there was, in contrast, an expansive
European Commission at work under the strong leadership of Jacques
Delors, who was quite successful in encouraging further integration within the
European Union. Despite similarities of content, the principle of subsidiarity
must not be seen as a counterpart to New Federalism. The principle of
subsidiarity is more of a (soft) brake on the integration process and was
introduced from the bottom up by the member states rather than being
expression of firm resolve for decentralization by the ‘federal’ level itself. At
the EU level there is still a powerful majority in the European Parliament, the
European civil service and the Commission for further integration.
Regarding the element of the network of actors we can observe that
the environmental movement in most American states is in a structurally
weaker position than in the Netherlands, particularly when issues other than
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nature and human health are at stake. The absence of a federal standard for
nitrate concentrations in the groundwater reinforces this inequality in this
specific case, but is also a reflection of this inequality.
A similar situation can also be observed regarding the perception of the
problem and the policy ambition. Placing restrictions on the use of private
property is a much more sensitive issue in the United States than in the
Netherlands. In the USA private property is not just an economic concept that
reflects certain benefits and disadvantages; it also has an ideological side to
it. Another aspect that has an effect on the perception of the problem within
the governance system is the fact that overfertilization with nitrate in the
Netherlands is a consequence of the need to get rid of waste (manure). In the
United States, at least in Florida, it is the consequence of the overabundant
supply of nutrients to plants. This is much less readily regarded as an act of
pollution than dumping manure on the land, which, quite apart from the
objective environmental consequences, ‘reeks’ more of pollution in the minds
of the general public.
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5 A dominant multilevel difference between Florida and
the Netherlands
5.1 Introduction
If we survey the large number of differences between Florida and the
Netherlands in the policy arenas we have investigated, the question that
arises is whether there is a dominant difference that makes the governance
structures of the two states substantially different, and that binds together a
number of observed differences. The main assumption that we formulated in
part 3 of this paper is that there will be mutual adjustment between the five
elements of governance and that this mutual adjustment can be traced back
to an orderly number of internal mechanisms in the governance system.
Changes in a governance system take place when external factors intervene
in one of the five elements of the system and the other elements adjust to the
resulting changes. The analysis of the case study in this paper focuses
primarily on the first element of governance, the multilevel aspect of the
governance system. The question we put to ourselves here, therefore, is
whether there is a multilevel aspect that makes the governance structure in
both states substantially different.
5.2  Regulation of land use: bottom-up or top-down?
Looking at the policy arena addressed by our research, what stands out is
that in the USA the protection of groundwater against agricultural pollution is
seen primarily as a responsibility of the lower levels of administration. In this
respect, great importance is attached to the autonomy of the states and local
authorities (Rosenbaum 1995; Cahn 1995). Measures to protect the
groundwater often relate directly to the nature of the land use and because
‘land use decision making’ is seen to be the exclusive domain of the lower
levels of government, the federal government at least is reluctant to take any
direct action. It is extremely rare for the federal government to directly prohibit
the use of a particular piece of land for a particular purpose; such interference
is politically unacceptable to many people (Portney 1992).
This reluctance at the federal level may be explained partly by the
philosophy of New Federalism that brought about a decentralization of
government tasks under the Reagan administration during the 1980s. In
many other countries, it was during the 1980s that national legislation for soil
and groundwater protection was introduced (a policy field that was given a
basis in law somewhat later than many other environmental sectors), while in
the USA the New Federalism was able to hold off similar developments. This
reluctance to legislate for groundwater protection can even be found in the
legislation of the state government of Florida. This reluctance may be
explained by a lack of state authority to control land use, a topic we return to
later.
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There is no such reluctance in the field of drinking water quality and
protection of surface water, but regulations in these areas have far fewer
direct consequences for the ownership rights of individual citizens. At the
federal level the Safe Drinking Water Act, which dates from 1974, lays down
the basis for setting drinking water quality standards. The Clean Water Act,
passed in 1977 (and which began as an amendment to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972) sets a number of quality standards on
discharges to surface waters. Florida has a longer tradition of legislation to
protect water quality.5
Although the state of Florida has always amended its own water
legislation to keep it in line with federal legislation, the state has not just taken
a wait-and-see attitude but has acted early on its own responsibilities. In an
attempt to classify the American states according to their degree of state
institutional capacity to absorb decentralized programmes and the degree of
state dependence on federal grants designed to support environmental
programmes, Davis & Lester grouped the states into four categories. In this
classification Florida belongs in the group of states which ‘have developed
strong institutional capabilities and are not heavily dependent upon federal aid
for implementing state environmental programs. In this instance, states rely
on their own fiscal resources, political institutions and state policy formulation
in the environmental area. They have established themselves as leaders in
the environmental sphere and have often enacted environmental standards
that exceed national standards (Davis & Lester 1989).
If we compare the picture at the federal level of government in the USA with
that of the European Union, one clear difference is that the EU (and its
forerunner, the EEC) has issued directives on water policy that the member
states are compelled to implement in their own national legislation within a
certain period of time. Here too, these directives are directed primarily at
maintaining the quality of drinking water and of surface waters in the Union. In
general, these directives are of two basic types. Either they concern water
use and are designed to protect the quality of water intended for particular
uses; or they concern water pollutants, and are designed to control the
emissions of particular pollutants to water (Brand, Hanf & Lipman 1998).
The EU took a clearly different path from the USA in 1991 when the
Nitrate Directive was issued. The purpose of this directive is to reduce water
pollution by ‘the application and storage of inorganic fertilizers and manure on
farmland’. It is aimed at both safeguarding drinking water supplies and
preventing wider ecological damage in the form of eutrophication of
freshwater and marine waters in general (Haigh 1992). With this directive the
EU has not only taken on the regulation of the use of farmland at the
supranational level, but adds the argument that such regulation, besides
safeguarding the quality of drinking water, also serves wider ecological
interests. This is a controversial directive in the Netherlands, as we noted in
                                           
5 In 1916 a Pollution of Waters Act was passed in which the state set out its own responsibility
for public health, and in consequence for the quality of the drinking water supply and the
discharge of sewage and effluents. In 1967 this was followed by the Florida Air and Water
Pollution Control Act. This was supplemented in 1972 by the Florida Water Resources Act and
in 1977 by the Florida Safe Drinking Water Act.
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the previous part of this paper, because the Netherlands has not succeeded
in fully meeting the implementation requirements of this directive (Kuks 1998).
If we compare the Netherlands as a member of the EU with the position of
Florida described above, we see a clear similarity in that the Netherlands has
not waited for European initiatives, but has developed its own legislation on
water quality at an early stage. We can state that the Netherlands, like
Florida, has adopted a proactive stance over the years.6
But here, too, a substantial difference between the two states arose in
1987, when the Soil Protection Act came into force in the Netherlands. This
act regulates the quality of the groundwater, not only to protect water
resources used for the supply of drinking water, but also to secure wider
ecological protection. Moreover, this act allows restrictions to be placed on
the use of farmland in the form of a set of fertilization standards. The intention
is to implement the EU Nitrate Directive at the national level through these
fertilization standards. And this is the fundamental difference with the situation
in Florida, where both the federal and state authorities have no possibilities
for regulating the use of farmland in order to protect groundwater quality.
In the USA, government decisions that affect farming practices, like land use
decisions, are by definition sensitive. The Floridian legislation contains
principles that grant a certain freedom to adopt agricultural practices as long
as these do not lead to contamination of the ‘common waters’ beyond the
permitted standards. The state can only intervene when agricultural pollution
of the ‘common waters’ is found to have taken place. Even then individual
farmers can only be held liable if this pollution can be traced back to them.
Although there is no ‘right to pollute’, farmers may not be hindered in the
running of their farms. As long as farmers adhere to ‘best management
practices’ and follow the instructions on the pesticide packaging they are
indemnified against liability for any damage. The Florida Right-To-Farm Act
(823.14, Florida Statutes) restricts nuisance suits against farmers by providing
that no farm, which was not a nuisance when it was established, will
constitute a public or private nuisance after one year of operation. Change of
ownership does not affect the provisions of the act. However, the act does not
extend protection to unsanitary conditions and health hazards or changes of
use, either in type or intensity (Olexa & Carricker 1992).
Our conclusion now is that there is a dominant difference between Florida
and the Netherlands regarding the possibilities for regulating the use of
farmland and farming practices from a centralized level with a view to
protecting groundwater quality. Using a number of observations, we now
examine to what extent we can find evidence to support this conclusion. In
doing this we delve somewhat deeper into some of the issues touched upon
in part 4.
                                           
6 Since 1957 drinking water quality in the Netherlands has been regulated by the Water Supply
Act; since 1970 the quality of surface waters and discharges to surface waters has been
regulated by the Surface Water Pollution Act; and since 1954 the abstraction of groundwater
has been regulated by the Groundwater Act (which was amended and extended in 1984 and
is comparable with the ‘consumptive use permitting’ under the Florida Water Resources Act
1972).
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5.3  Tendency towards specific versus generic legislation
The main feature of the groundwater protection policy introduced in the
Netherlands is that in 1987 generic national legislation was introduced that
prescribes the amount of nitrate that may be applied to agricultural land. In
1989 these were supplemented by regional generic standards (by the
provinces) that apply to groundwater protection areas. These standards
define the maximum amount of manure that may be spread onto agricultural
land, depending on the type of farmland in question. The standards are
expressed in kilograms of phosphate per hectare per year, and different
standards apply to three types of land: arable land for maize cultivation,
grassland, and other arable land. Initially the standards covered only
phosphate, but in the 1990s nitrogen standards were also introduced. A
characteristic feature of the Dutch policy, therefore, is the choice of a generic
regulation with limited differentiation according to geographic and hydrological
conditions; this is seen to be a way of treating farmers equally in law.
This policy takes account of three different environmental problems
that stem from the same source. The three problems are: the emission of
ammonia from manure spread on the land, which contributes to acidification
of the environment; leaching of phosphates from manure spread on the land
into ditches, which results in the eutrophication of surface waters; and
leaching of nitrogen from manure into the groundwater, which leads
eventually to nitrate levels in excess of the quality standard. Nitrate standards
for drinking water form part of the argument for setting these manure
standards. In the Netherlands, therefore, the standard for nitrate in drinking
water does not only apply to the suppliers of drinking water, but also forms the
basis for a set of generic standards that place restrictions on agricultural
practices (Kuks 1992, 1998).
A characteristic of the groundwater protection policy in Florida is that it sets
no such generic standards. It is true that Florida state has, on its own initiative
and without pressure from the federal government, translated the nitrate
standard for drinking water into an equally stringent nitrate standard for
groundwater covering the whole state. This is comparable with the EU
directive covering nitrate in groundwater, which is applicable to the whole of
the territory of the Netherlands (and the shallow groundwater zones). But the
scope of this standard goes no further than a generic environmental quality
standard, with no direct consequences for individual farms.
It may appear from this that the state of Florida has chosen a much
more generic policy than the Netherlands, but the Floridian standard can only
be made operational by legally demonstrating that emissions from an
individual farm are responsible for excessive levels of nitrate in the
groundwater. Proving a direct link is very difficult, though, because it is almost
impossible to demonstrate that certain concentrations of nitrate in
groundwater are due to leaching from specific sources. But a more
fundamental feature of the policy is that the standard implicitly differentiates
between specific conditions on each individual farm. Nitrate from any one
farm only becomes a problem after the local soil and hydrological conditions
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have done their work. This is not the only example of a regulation in which
specific conditions are expressly taken into account; it illustrates a much wider
tendency within Floridian governance in the field of groundwater protection.
We now add three observations to this argument.
The first observation concerns the way monitoring data on groundwater
quality are used. An evaluation of the Ground Water Quality Monitoring
Program (DeHaan 1995), which has been running since 1983, found that
‘Since the publication in 1992 of the report on data collected between 1984
and 1988, there has not been a written analysis of data collected since that
time. The program currently does not have solid strategies for developing a
summary report on each monitoring cycle that would aid, especially the non-
technical users in making decisions.’ It has not been possible, therefore, to
draw any policy-relevant conclusions from the data collected. ‘The 1984–1988
sampling cycle indicated the findings of 18,861 instances where contaminant
levels exceeded water quality standards. Although this figure represents only
2.5 per cent of incidents documented (thus indicating a ‘good’ background
water quality), the program does not have the strategies to trace these
detections to their sources or track their movement and fate.’ This means that
only the bare facts have been registered, without drawing any conclusions
from these about the source or the effects of the detected contamination.
When considering the level funding, the authority that commissioned the
programme was not aware of the results that could be achieved with the
money that was made available.7
Licensing authorities do not make use of the data generated by the
monitoring programme because the data do not make a sufficient link to the
source of the pollution and because the monitoring programme focuses
primarily on the deep groundwater.8 The author of the report concludes that
‘data will have to be extremely site-specific and source specific to be of any
use to regulatory (permitting) or policy decisions by local, regional or state
agencies’ because it would be too easy to mount a legal challenge to a land
use decision.
According to the report there appear to be two cases in which
groundwater monitoring data have had consequences for the policy pursued.
‘The GWIS [the database containing all the monitoring data] has contributed
to the identification of regional ground water contamination in two areas of the
state (Polk County and Suwannee River Basin) for contamination with
bromacil and nitrates, respectively. These findings have been useful in
                                           
7 ‘The 1995 audit [of the program] reported that the Department’s evaluation of program
achievement does not provide any assessment of the effectiveness of the ground water
quality monitoring program activities. Consequently, neither the Department nor the
Legislature is able to evaluate program accomplishments in relation to the budget request as
intended.’
8 ‘In interviewing districts Water Facility Administrators and their staff about the utility of this
program to their daily activities, none of them could recall a case where program data were
used to augment their permit evaluation needs. […] Those who were familiar with the ground
water monitor networks, cited the fact that the majority of network wells were deep Floridian
wells that did not reflect impacts of permitted facilities on shallow or surficial aquifers water
quality. Another reason mentioned for the limited utility of monitoring network data, is one of
scale. The fact that the network is designed to obtain an idea of the regional impact of land
use was described as being of “little use” to the permit writers.’
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generating regulation by DACS (agriculture department) prohibiting bromacil
use in certain highly permeable soil types. The nitrate findings have resulted
in closer coordination between DEP (environment department), DACS and
the Suwannee River Water Management District in developing agricultural
and dairy Best Management Practices (BMP’s).’ The monitoring report,
however, puts the value of monitoring data in these types of case into
perspective by quoting one frustrated interviewee who complained that ‘… all
that resulted from these cases was recommendations for BMPs which must
once again be site-specific. Did we need to spend millions of dollars to tell us
that agriculture generate nitrates and pesticides that demand better
management practices that must be site-specific to be effective?’
A second observation that is illustrative of the tendency in Florida to take
more account of specific circumstances in its pesticides policy than the
Netherlands concerns the policy on pesticides. We should first note that the
way in which pesticides are approved for use (on the market) in Florida and
the Netherlands is roughly the same.
However, in the Netherlands an additional policy was introduced in the
Multi-year Crop Protection Plan in the form of a voluntary agreement, or
‘covenant’, with the agricultural sector. The settlement aims at a decrease in
the structural dependence on pesticides for crop protection and at a general
reduction in the use of pesticides. Besides these generic goals, the plan
contains more specific objectives for the year 2015. First, the overall use of
pesticides has to be reduced by 50% by 2000 (compared with the amount
used in 1987). Second, harmful pesticides must be removed from use
altogether. Indicators for the predicate ‘harmful’ are ‘underground mobility’,
‘persistence’ (degradability) and toxicity (how harmful they are in an aquatic
system). In fact, pesticides that have the potential to leach into the
groundwater must be reviewed for re-registration. It has been left to the sector
itself to determine how to reach these goals (Kuks 1998).
In Florida such a generic approach geared to banning pesticides or
achieving a general reduction in the use of pesticides does not seem to be
feasible. In an interview, the senior civil servant responsible for the pesticides
policy from the agriculture department (DACS) in Florida gave the following
answer: ‘We shy away from a percentage in reduction. The numbers don’t
say something about a reduction in risk. With the variety in commodities you
have a big variety in crops. It is more important to work on several risk
reductions. There are a lot of variables that we can’t control, and that is
influencing the effects. There is never one overall BMP.’ In short, it is seen as
an achievement that the pesticides regulations make distinctions according to
the crop and type of application. Instead of generic pesticides reduction goals
a holistic approach has been chosen in the form of ‘integrated pest
management’ geared to ‘safer use’, but not a ‘ban on pesticides’.
A third observation that is illustrative of the tendency in Florida to take more
account of specific circumstances than in the Netherlands is the decision to
regulate nitrates in covenants with the agricultural sector which define ‘best
management practices’ (BMPs).
These covenants are made with the target groups and signed by the
departments involved (DACS for agriculture, DEP for environment, DHRS for
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public health), the relevant ‘commodities’ (organizations represent specific
agricultural sectors) and the Florida Farm Bureau as general representative of
the agricultural sector. The basis for these covenants is the Nitrate Bill,
introduced in 1993 (adding Chapter 576 to the Florida Fertilizer Law). When
individual farms sign a BMP covenant they agree to comply with best
management practices in exchange for exemption from liability for any
groundwater pollution originating from their farm. In effect, the farmers receive
a ‘waiver of liability’ in return for a commitment that does not place any firm
restrictions on farming practices, but is intended to bring about the most
effective use of nitrates and pesticides by the farmer as possible. Detailed
specifications for achieving this are drawn up first in the form of separate
documents for each farm type. Within each BMP there are further
opportunities to elaborate on these to suit individual farms and specific soil
conditions.
We should mention here that an attempt was also made in the
Netherlands to prevent any further tightening up of the nutrient standards,
which were actually needed in order to meet the requirements of the EU
Nitrate Directive. A system of nutrient accounting was introduced in which
farms attempt to reduce the application of nutrients through more efficient
farming practices, but the EU considered that this system relied too much on
intent rather than results, and consequently found it to be inadequate (Kuks
1998).
5.4  The political position of the environment department
Our original proposition was that there is a dominant difference between
Florida and the Netherlands regarding the possibilities for centrally regulating
agricultural use of the land and farming practices with a view to protecting
groundwater quality. Using observations we have tried to substantiate the
argument that in Florida there is a greater tendency to draw up regulations for
specific conditions than establish generic measures. The assumption here is
that centralized regulation goes hand in hand with generic measures. In this
section we expand on our original proposition in a different direction. We will
try to show that environment departments in Florida and the Netherlands have
different political positions and consequently differ in their ability to control
events.
In the Netherlands the environment and agriculture ministries have for a long
time essentially operated independently of each other. The environment
ministry tried to get the manure problem onto the political agenda in the
1970s but it only succeeded in 1984. Until then the agricultural sector had
worked closely with the agriculture ministry and farmers representatives in key
political positions in an ‘iron triangle’,  and could simply ignore the problem.
Actually, the Dutch agriculture ministry had recognized the problem much
earlier and had attempted to prepare draft legislation with cooperation from its
own natural constituency, while expressly keeping the environment ministry
out of the discussions.
Meanwhile, the environment ministry was preparing its own manure legislation
as part of new integral soil protection act. When both ministries put forward
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their own draft legislation, political pressure was put on them to work together.
In 1982 a new environment minister was appointed who was a strong political
figure. He gave his ministry considerable political clout, and from that time on
the environmental issue was tackled more as a management issue and the
environment ministry developed a more cooperative attitude towards the
target groups in society. Partly because of this, the two ministries were able to
reach a compromise in 1984 in which they agreed to continue both legislative
processes but link them together.
From that moment the environment ministry developed the Soil
Protection Act, which formed the basis for the standards for the application of
manure on agricultural land in order to protect the soil and indirectly the air,
surface waters, the groundwater and ultimately drinking water. The agriculture
ministry developed the Manure Act, which was primarily geared to dealing
with the surplus manure that would result from these application standards.
The act also contained preventive measures based on innovative agricultural
practices designed to reduce the amount of manure produced. Both laws
were passed in 1987 and from that moment the level of cooperation between
the two ministries has grown. Both ministries have created departments to
give further shape to the cooperation between environment and agriculture
through a series of detailed discussions.
We can state, therefore, that from 1984 the environment ministry (VROM) has
gained and held a position from which it can exert increasing influence over
environmental legislation aimed at the agricultural sector. We see also that
since then agriculture has come under increasing pressure from the
environmental legislation. In 1995 this resulted in both the agriculture and
environment ministries forcing the livestock farming sector to reduce the
volume of manure it produces (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Kuks 1998).
It is a remarkable resemblance with the Netherlands that during the same
period in Florida also some sort of co-operation has grown between  the
environmental department (DER, after 1993 called DEP) and the agricultural
department (DACS). Like in the Netherlands, this co-operation in Florida is
having its origins in an authority conflict, in the first instance not regarding the
regulation of nitrates but regarding the regulation of pesticides. In 1982
officials discovered that drinking water wells had been contaminated by the
commonly used pesticide Temik. These discoveries led the state’s
Commissioner of Agriculture to ban use of the pesticide temporarily. In the
summer of 1983 still more drinking water wells were discovered to be
contaminated, this time by a pesticide called EDB (ethylene dibromide), a
substance in common and extensive use for at least twenty years, even by
the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services itself, as a
nematocide on buffer areas surrounding commercial citrus groves. Again, the
Commissioner of Agriculture was stirred to action and banned use of the
chemical. The Florida legislature addressed many of these problems in the
Water Quality Assurance Act of 1983. The act was conceived to assure to the
greatest extent possible the future protection of the quality of Florida’s water
resources.
The Water Quality Assurance Act gave the environmental department
almost $120 million, principally for the creation of new programs to help
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preserve the quality of the state’s waters. It created within the department
more than 100 new positions and the need to promulgate scores of new rules
to interpret new statutory language (Fernald and Patton 1985). The Water
Quality Assurance Act gave the Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services (DACS) primarily authority for review and regulation of pesticides
with DEP relegated to a review-and-comment role. DACS became the state
leading agency for pesticides regulation9 and a Bureau for Pesticides was
established at DACS. Also a nine-member Pesticide Review Council was
created within DACS and charged with reviewing data on restricted-use
pesticides that are presently registered in the state, and reviewing all
applications for registration of restricted-use pesticides. Procedures were
established for requiring field testing of restricted use pesticides in Florida
under criteria developed by the state. The final determination of whether a
restricted-use pesticide should be registered for use in Florida lies with DACS
(Olexa and Carricker 1992).
In the meantime, DEP reacted to the highly visible issue of pesticides
discoveries in groundwater by creating a ‘pesticides section’. At that time
questions were asked, by both DACS and the industry, as to DEPs jurisdiction
on pesticides and agrochemicals in general. DEP countered these arguments
at the time by saying that they (not DACS) were responsible for water quality
deterioration by contaminants, to which DACS responded by the statement
that pesticides and fertilizers were beneficial products, not contaminants, and
that contamination results only from misuse for which they were solely
responsible. DACS felt that DEPs need for involvement in agricultural issues
could be satisfied by their membership on the Pesticides Review Council
(PRC) (DeHan 1995). In 1985 this provoked both departments  to sign a
Memorandum of Mutual Understanding on how to deal commonly with
pesticides issues, making it possible for DACS to use DEPs authority (DEP is
collecting data, the regulatory part is turned over to DACS). In 1986 new
discoveries of EDB and Aldicarb in groundwater got also the health
department (DHRS) involved in the pesticides registration process and the
Pesticide Review Council.
The same sort of process was happening after discoveries of
unacceptable levels of nitrates in groundwater in the late eighties (around
1989). DEP wanted to start with the creation of a database on nitrate
contaminations in an effort to prepare regulations to minimize the impact of
nitrates on drinking water quality. DEP could make use of its authority to
delineate areas with groundwater contamination where consumptive water
use would be subjected to permitting by the five regional water management
districts (WMDs). DACS on the other hand, fearing to much control over the
nitrates issue by DEP, wanted to put forward its own authority on basis of the
already existing Fertilizer’s Act. However this act wasn’t providing yet a basis
for regulation of nitrates. In 1992 an Ag Water Policy Group was created
within DACS to handle nitrates issues and to establish a focal point for
cooperation with DEP and the WMDs. Although DEP remained statutorily
responsible for exercising oversight over the WMDs, DACS got unofficially
involved in the control over the WMDs from this moment on. A high official of
                                           
9 Like DEP had already been entitled to be the state leading agency for drinking water
regulation since 1977 with the Florida health department (DHRS) relegated to a review-and-
comment role
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DEP, responsible for dealing with the WMDs, even moved to the office of the
Commissioner of Agriculture to continue the same kind of work in another
department.
In 1993 the Nitrate Bill was passed, added as a new chapter to the
Fertilizer’s Act, in which the Florida legislature placed the statutorily
responsibility for fertilizer regulation, like the responsibility for pesticides
regulation, in the hands of DACS. So, DACS also became the state leading
agency for that. The Nitrate Bill made it possible for farmers to agree on so-
called Best Management Practices (BMPs) for their farm in order to get a
waiver of liability for unacceptable levels of nitrate emissions (coming from
their farming practices) to groundwater. The Nitrate Bill also established more
involvement for the WMDs, by creating a participatory role for them in the
Pesticides Review Council. In 1994 the Office of Water Policy was
established at DACS close to the Commissioner, to have a more formal basis
for overviewing the role WMDs are playing on agricultural issues. And also in
1994 the rivalry between DEP and DACS on nitrates issues ended up in
another Memorandum of Mutual Understanding on how to deal with nitrate
BMPs. Both departments agreed on implementation of the Nitrate Bill through
voluntary based agreements with farmers (prepared through negotiations with
farmer commodity groups and developed on the basis of research), allowing
farmers to choose between a liability for groundwater emissions (leaving the
burden of proof to DEP) or a waiver of liability together with BMPs. DEP is
offering the waiver of liability, DACS is doing the implementation of the BMP-
program.
Comparing the Floridian case and the Dutch case, it seems to us that there is
a remarkable difference in political interest in an effective groundwater
protection policy at the state or national level. Especially if we look at the
position and control capacity of both environmental departments, it is clear
that the Dutch department VROM obtained a much stronger position in
regulating farming practices for groundwater protection reasons, while the
Floridian department DEP finds its role much more restricted. There are at
least four indications for this weaker position of the Florida environmental
department.
First of all, we should realize that the political attention given to pesticides in
the early eighties and the passage of the Water Quality Assurance Act in
1983 was impulsed by bad publicity about Florida’s pollution problems,
including embarrassing stories in national magazines as ‘Time’ and ‘Sports
Illustrated’10. Several politicians saw opportunities in such public attention and
quickly moved to associate themselves with the movement for environmental
action. In contrast to the legislature’s overwhelming support for the WQAA
itself, there was deep disagreement over how to fund the law. Although 1983
was ‘the year of water quality’, funding from general revenues could easily be
cut back in following years, when the legislature’s attention focused on other
                                           
10 : Williams and Matheny (1995) are describing how the ‘Time’ cover story was particularly
damaging. ‘Entitled ‘Paradise Lost’, it chronicled not only environmental problems, but ethnic
strife and drug and crime problems as well. ‘Sports Illustrated’, in analyzing Florida’s daunting
water problems, suggested that drinking from a tap in the Sunshine State was like hooking up
the kitchen faucet to the toilet.’
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hot issues. After 1983, there were few dramatic, visible disasters to keep the
issue in the spotlight, and other pressing public issues - e.g. drugs and crime -
drew media attention in subsequent years (Williams and Matheny 1995).
Although the WQAA has strengthened DEPs position as the state
leading agency for drinking water issues, the passage of the act appeared to
be a symbolic gesture of the Florida legislature. Only temporarily budgets for
monitoring activities were provided and the WQAA was mostly heading for
clean up activities, not so much for preventive policies and not at all for a
prevention oriented regulatory approach. In the US political attention for
environmental control is often driven by media attention. Many states lack the
technical resources to develop numerical standards for many groundwater
contaminants and instead depend on evidence of environmental damage or
public health risks before acting to control these substances (Rosenbaum
1995).
Also Cahn (1995) thinks that as a result of high public anxiety over
water pollution, policy elites have marketed water policy as bold regulation,
satisfying public demand, though the policies themselves are problematic:
enforcement is weak and discretionary; standards are weak; and only a
fraction of waterborne pollutants are monitored.11 In Florida the creation of a
pesticides section in DEP in response to brush fires caused by aldicarb, and
later on by EDB, is regarded as an example of management by crisis
abatement instead of planing (DeHan 1995).
Secondly, nitrates didn’t get the media attention which had been given to
pesticides. Pesticides seem to be more scary to people, and most concern
has been about pesticides being dangerous and badly managed, while
nitrates simply were no concern in terms of being noxious. The nitrates issue
also came up in a different context (separate statutes, separate programs).
For example there is no federal vehicle for nitrates like there is for pesticides
(FIFRA) or like the nitrate directive for groundwater in the EU. At that time
DEP was also struggling with its regulatory image: many people (especially
farmers)  in Florida were sick of public regulations, which other people were
describing as a ‘get-of-my-back-syndrome’. DEP was desperately seeking for
non-regulatory actions and had a preference for voluntary based programs.
Therefor DEP felt itself dependent upon DACS for getting a fertilizer policy
accepted by the farming community.
In an evaluation of the Ag Source and Water Well Management
Section within DEP, it was stated that DEP is playing second fiddle to DACS
which is the Department statutorily responsible for pesticides and fertilizer
regulation in Florida. The effectiveness of DEP is considered to be limited
because of the placement, by the Legislature, of the nitrate BMP research
responsibility in the hands of DACS; the placement of the responsibility of
drafting, development, and implementation of the Pesticides and Ground
                                           
11 Cahn (1995) is comparing the symbolic aspects of water policy to those of air policy. ‘Both
followed mass public demand for improved environmental conditions. And both air and water
policies were enacted with strong standards and strict deadlines - even though few legislators
expected compliance. Clean water policies focus on establishing standards requiring
expensive control technologies and then inviting voluntary compliance, resulting in what can
only be called regulatory stalemate.’
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Water State Management Plan required by EPA in the hands of DACS; the
fact that the Pesticides Review Council is only an advisory body to the
Commissioner of Agriculture and that DEP is only a participating member
(DeHan, 1995).
Thirdly, even though DEP is statutorily responsible for exercising the oversight
over the WMDs, the department is faced with the political and financial reality
of WMDs independence. The WMDs started already around 1984 on the
issue of nutrients on basis of the SWIM Act (Surface Water Improvement and
Management Act). Since that time they have been a principal agency in
management of surface water and land use. Every agricultural operation that
expands had to have a permit from a water management district.
Thus, a very clear distribution of authority has grown through the years,
in which DEP and the WMDs are both natural resources oriented, however
with restricting the authority of DEP to regulating water quality, while the
WMDs are having the authority to regulate on-site operations, like water well
construction, water use and land use. Only DACS (being industry oriented) is
entitled to regulate farming operations. With this distribution of authorities, it is
very hard for DEP to proof cases of groundwater contamination caused by
farming practices. Even for the delineation of contaminated areas, with the
purpose of preventing inhabitants to consume contaminated water, DEP is
dependent upon the WMDs.
Centralization of the authorities attributed to the lower administrative
levels is still controversial, both in the case that WMDs are taking over
authority that has been originally in the hands of the counties as in the case
that the state level is taking over authority that has been originally in the
hands of the WMDs. On the other hand, both tendencies are taking place.
We were mentioning already that DACS is trying to get more control over the
WMDs. DEP is having more problems with that. For example in 1988, the
federal government (EPA) sewed the WMD South to better protect the
Everglades by regulating agricultural practices in the Everglades Ag Area,
south of Lake Okeechobee, which actually should have been done by DEP.
This case is being referred to as the Everglades Ag Case.
A fourth indication for a weaker political position of the Florida environment
department is concerning the department’s prestige. Although the department
is rather proactive in developing environmental policy programs, compared to
other US-states, and has a good performance in developing environmental
policy programs, compared to other US-states, the image of DEP-people in
general seems to be that they don’t believe in cost share or incentive
programs; that they prefer heavily control, although they don’t have funding
sources and staff for that; that they are more occupied with paperwork; that
they are more occupied with domestic and industrial waste.
Especially among farmers, DEP is having a bad image and regarded to
be traditionally regulatory and enforcement oriented. It is the nature of their
authority and their programs, farmers are saying. It explains why DEP is
desperately seeking for actions that are non-regulatory. The lack of  financial
means for implementation (as we described before) is also resulting in
relatively lower salaries and lower status for employees of the department,
compared to similar positions in neighbouring states (Alabama and Georgia)
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as well as to similar positions of county or city environmental officials. We
also noticed already that the department is lacking a commissioner of cabinet
officer to make it more political influential.
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6 Conclusion: three mechanisms by which the dominant
difference takes effect
In this paper we have developed a model of governance to allow us to
compare governance systems in different states or countries as they relate to
a certain policy arena. We identified five elements of governance, one of
which relates to the multilevel aspect. Moreover, we made a main assumption
that mutual adjustment will take place between the five elements of
governance and that this mutual adjustment can be traced back to three
internal mechanisms (secondary assumptions) in the governance system.
Changes in a governance system take place when outside factors intervene
in one of the five elements of the governance system and the other elements
adjust to this new situation.
We then used this model to make a comparison between the
governance structure for groundwater and drinking water protection in Florida
and the Netherlands. More specifically, we looked at protection against nitrate
and pesticides used in agriculture and which, via the groundwater, can cause
contamination of the drinking water supply. In doing this we asked ourselves
to what extent different states with similar policy problems develop a similar
policy response, to what extent there may be striking differences and how
these differences can be explained by the workings of the governance
system.
In addition to a number of clear similarities regarding the distribution of
governance between the various administrative levels, we have seen that
there is a dominant difference between Florida and the Netherlands regarding
the possibilities for central regulation of agricultural land use and farming
practices with a view to protecting the quality of the groundwater.
In the USA and Florida, land use decisions are primarily seen as
belonging within the competence of the lowest, or most local, tier of
government (counties and municipalities). The federal government and the
state of Florida have hardly any influence over land use decisions, while at
the regional level the growing restrictions being placed on land use by the
water management districts are controversial. In contrast, we have seen that
there is active intervention from the center in groundwater protection issues in
the EU and the Netherlands, involving restrictions being placed on the use of
agricultural land and on farming practices. In Florida intervention from the
center is only permitted to the agriculture department and only then for
incentives not restrictions (through the use of voluntary agreements on best
management practices).
The environment department can only achieve something in the
agricultural sector if it adheres closely to the strictures of the agriculture
department. In contrast, we have seen that, over the years, the agriculture
ministry in the Netherlands has had to let itself be guided by the environment
ministry and has gradually had to give in to restrictive measures being
imposed on farmers, despite the presence of an influential agriculture lobby in
the Netherlands, as in Florida. The Dutch environment ministry receives much
more political support and guidance than the environment department in
Florida.
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In Florida the environment department’s powers are limited primarily to setting
quality standards for drinking water and, in cooperation with the water
management districts, delineating vulnerable water abstraction areas. The
environment department has been able to strengthen its position in this policy
arena in relation to the agriculture department mainly because of a number of
major incidents of groundwater contamination during the 1980s. These
attracted much media attention and threatened the image of Florida’s main
tourist attraction, its undamaged and exceptionally varied wetland
ecosystems. The public demand for action following these incidents, however,
resulted in partly ‘symbolic’ policy: a temporary financial injection for
monitoring activities and a curative policy response (clean-up program). Little
in the way of preventive policy came out of it. We also saw how the
centralized approach in Florida is hampered by a fragmented water supply
system, with many individual and small-scale drinking water suppliers. This
has led to a policy in the first instance geared to implementing curative
measures to protect public health and much less concerned with preventive
measures. Moreover, centralization of water management in Florida, in which
the autonomy of the counties is restricted by the water management districts
and that of the water management districts by the state, is controversial.
As all the water supply systems in the Netherlands are large in scale,
more attention is paid to safeguarding water resources for the future and so
has the policy has a preventive character. We also noticed that that in Florida
there is a tendency for regulations to be highly specific to certain conditions
and, in contrast with the Netherlands, generic measures are avoided.
The presence or otherwise of a tendency towards a centralized
approach seems to be a crucial difference between Florida and the
Netherlands. This difference does not only work consistently through the
governance subsystem at each of the four intervention points, but also within
a governance system from one element to another. This suggests that it is a
feature that typically leads to adjustment between elements of a governance
system, thus giving that system a ‘genetic’ imprint. It is also interesting to
examine which mechanisms are at work during this process. We stated that
our main assumption rested on three mechanisms (secondary assumptions).
The first mechanism (secondary assumption 1) is that adjustment arises from
the tendency of actors to act from a set of constant values. In Florida, this
mechanism relates primarily to the value places on freedom; the equivalent in
the Netherlands is the value placed on community spirit. Of course, this is a
relative difference. For example, In Florida this value is expressed in the
many small-scale water supply systems and by an aversion to public utilities.
It is also expressed as an anti-government sentiment and a dislike of generic
regulations. This weakens the position of environment department and forces
them to take a voluntary incentive-based approach, and it leads at all levels of
government to measures geared to specific conditions. It is also expressed in
the different meanings attached to the administrative concepts of New
Federalism in the USA and subsidiarity in the EU. New Federalism recognizes
the autonomy of local politics and believes that centralized levels of
government add little value. Subsidiarity, in principle, recognizes collective
values and states that collective decisions should be taken at that level at
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which the common interest is served, and accepts the limitations this places
on individual autonomy.
The second mechanism (secondary assumption 2) is that adjustment arises
from the tendency of actors to use a common reference frame to interpret
cognition. In the case study this mechanism mainly relates to the way the
policy problem of ‘groundwater contamination by pesticides and nitrates’ is
interpreted. In Florida this problem is interpreted mainly in terms of public
health, which leads to a curative approach involving clean-up measures and
defining water abstraction areas where drinking water consumers can be
regulated. In the Netherlands the problem is interpreted mainly in terms of
long-term sustainability, in which the concern is the need for a lasting, and
thus preventive, solution. Water abstraction areas, for example, are identified
for the purpose of ensuring extra regulation of activities that may be a source
of pollutants. Preventive measures to control sources of groundwater
pollutants are also implemented outside these areas.
The third mechanism (secondary assumption 3) is that adjustment arises from
the dependence of actors on each others resources. Such dependence is
clearly expressed in the demarcation of powers between administrative levels
and between administrative actors. A striking feature in Florida is that the
lower levels of government (both the counties and the water management
districts) operate largely autonomously, while in the Netherlands these
authorities (municipalities, water boards and provinces) execute many of their
tasks jointly. Moreover, in Florida the competence of the environment
department to act remains limited to setting environmental quality standards
and its enforcement; there is little support for measures aimed specifically at
target groups that go beyond a voluntary incentive-based approach. The
department is totally subordinate to the agriculture department or to the water
management districts, certainly as far as agriculture is concerned or where
control over land use is involved. In the Netherlands the environment ministry
has been able to break the power monopoly held by the ‘iron triangle’ in the
agriculture sector and has been accepted as an influential partner in the
administration of agricultural affairs.
The analysis in this paper has shown that ‘governance’ involves more
elements than policy objectives and the means to implement policy. These
elements are not simply the sum of individual aspects but are closely
interlinked. We have tried to illustrate how these interrelations work. The case
study we used for this was the comparison between the Netherlands and
Florida regarding the protection of the quality of groundwater and drinking
water. The high degree of similarity between both states highlights the
differences, which exist as well. The interrelations between these differences
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